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ABSTRACT

The last quarter of a century has produced a growing legitimacy crisis in the
criminal justice system arising from profound and familiar differences in race and
class. The same tactics used to win the War on Crime also harassed and intimidated
the very people policing was supposed to protect, sending disproportionate numbers
of young minority men and women to prison as part of War On Drugs.
In this article, I take up challenge of social norms theorists who advocate
empowering police and local communities through a variety of traditional and newly
minted public order offenses. My claim is that the sort of preventative policing they
advocate, singling out quality of life issues, can and should be separated from
reactive investigative policing directed at apprehending criminals. The police, as
currently constituted, are simply the wrong people to engage in preventative policing.
My proposal is to radically restructure the manner in which we think about the
legitimacy of various policing practices and the type of authority wielded by the
police. The rule-based attempt to limit police authority through prospective
constitutional (and other) norms limiting their ability to search, seize, and
interrogate suspects does not work to constrain their ability to police public order
and engage in crime prevention. Instead, I propose a series of role-based constraints
of the scope of police authority.
Much like the separation-of-powers limitation upon the various branches of
government, role-based constraints suggest that municipalities should match the
authority conferred upon particular government officials to the specific problems to
be addressed through public order policing. The appropriate local authorities
include bus drivers and crossing guards: municipal officials with no power to engage
in investigation but who have the authority to enforce norms of public order. Such
officials possess limited institutional legitimacy outside of their various spheres of
operation and no role-based authority to engage in the invasive, investigative
policing practices currently utilized in predominantly urban areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate
investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts
still retain their traditional responsibility to guard
against police conduct which is over-bearing or
harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary
justification
which
the
Constitution
requires. … And, of course, our approval of
legitimate and restrained investigative conduct
undertaken on the basis of ample factual
justification should in no way discourage the
employment of other remedies than the
exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that
sanction may prove inappropriate.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968)

Despite the many strides made in sharply reducing the rate of violent crime,
the last quarter of a century has produced a growing legitimacy crisis in the
criminal justice system.1 That the crisis is not experienced in a uniform
manner across all segments of our society is not a cause for complacency, but
an additional source of concern. Put simply, whether or not you regard the
techniques and targets of policing as well chosen depends in part upon
profound and familiar differences of race, political affiliation, and place of
residence.2 Most intriguingly, a lack of uniformity among racial, political, and
geographical groups only adds to the confusion.3
A central paradox of the War on Crime is that the means by which it
triumphed alienated those it was intended to liberate. Increased policing of
urban communities has, by at least one measure, resoundingly succeeded:
serious crime is down everywhere.4 Nonetheless, many of those concerned
1

See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT — RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 45 (1995); compare Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure—Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153, 1160-66 (1998) (hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Crisis).
2
See TONRY, supra note 1, at 4-5; compare William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1871, 1875-76 (2000) (hereinafter Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes); William J. Stuntz,
Race, Class, And Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1801-3, 1813-15 (1998) (hereinafter
Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs).
3
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998) (hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE
& CRIME); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1270-76 (1994) (hereinafter Kennedy, State & Criminal
Law).
4
See, e.g. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing
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with racial disparities in policing have pointed out that the same tactics used to
win the War on Crime have also served to harass and intimidate the very
people such policing was supposed to protect.5 Policing may be working, but
at what cost?
The debate over the appropriate manner of policing urban, minority
communities has riven the liberal criminal law community.6 In particular,
liberal legal theorists7 have clashed with the relatively liberal proponents of
economic or administrative approaches to law — who I shall broadly call
social norms theorists8 — over policing public order. The heart of that debate
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 329-331 (1998) (citing Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining
Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1998);
Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner City Neighborhoods: Crime,
Violence, Drugs and Use in the 1990's, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1998); Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 369 (1997)
(hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning).
5
See TONRY, supra note 1; Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44
UCLA L. REV. 143, 154 (1996); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment
on Randall Kennedy's “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995) (hereinafter Cole,
Paradox of Race and Crime); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-55 (1999) (hereinafter COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE).
See also Tracey L. Meares, Place And Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 680 (1998)
(hereinafter Meares, Place And Crime).
6
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 684-94 (critiquing the race-based analyses of Paul
Butler and of Angela Davis) (citing Butler, supra note 5, at 154; Paul Butler, Affirmative
Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 884 (1997) (hereinafter Butler,
Affirmative Action); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (hereinafter Butler, Jury Nullification);
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Angela
Jordan Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 13 (1998)). Compare KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3 with Paul Butler,
(Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270
(1998); compare Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1270-76 with Cole,
Paradox of Race and Crime, supra note 5.
7
When discussing legal liberalism I mean to follow William H. Simon’s use of the term. See
William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to
Liberal Legalism (August 1, 2003 version), unpublished manuscript at 7-10 (describing
liberal legal theorists as subscribing to a “victim perspective… fundamentally concerned with
the needs of the wounded and vulnerable” and a “commitment to formulating certain
fundamental norms as…analytical, individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and
corrective…[r]ights…derived analytically by the application of legal reasoning to
authoritative sources”).
8
These social norms theories have been variously described as “legal pragmatism,” see
Simon, supra note 7, at 48-74; “norm focused scholarship,” see Bernard E. Harcourt, After
the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in
Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 179, 179 (2000); Tracey
L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms Of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 805, 806 (1998) (hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Norms); the “New Chicago School,” see
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); and the “new
discretion scholars,” David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
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concerns the best means by which to ensure quality of life in urban minority
communities while avoiding sending young Black and Latino men and
(increasingly) women to prison as part of War On Drugs.9
In this article, I take up challenge of social norms theorists who advocate
empowering police and local communities through a variety of traditional and
newly minted public order offenses as means of attacking high crime in urban
and predominantly minority neighborhoods.10 My claim is that the sort of
preventative policing they advocate, singling out public order or quality of life
issues, can and should be separated from reactive investigative policing
directed at apprehending criminals. Given such a separation of prevention and
investigation, the police, as currently constituted, are the wrong people to
engage in preventative policing. Instead, the appropriate people include meter
readers, bus drivers, and crossing guards: municipal officials with no power to
engage in investigation but who have the authority to enforce norms of public
order.
My proposal is to radically restructure the manner in which we think about the
legitimacy of various policing practices and the type of authority wielded by
the police. Our current focus on constitutional remedies for low-level police
abuses has failed to ameliorate the legitimacy crisis faced by the police and the
justified resentment expressed by individuals and local communities subject to
heightened amounts of policing that is taking increasingly invasive forms.
The attempt to limit police authority through prospective constitutional (and
other) norms limiting their ability to search, seize, and interrogate suspects is
properly confined to the police’s investigative role. It does not work to
constrain their ability to police public order and engage in crime prevention.
Yet even at the investigative stage, the Court has already replaced the rulebased due-process model of authority11 with a series of role-based exceptions
to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ constitutional requirements.
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1062 (1999)
(herinafter Cole, Discretion).
9
See Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1836.
10
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 223-24 (1998) (herinafter Meares, Social Organization) (curfew; antiloitering ordinance; reverse sting); Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 699 (curfew;
anti-loitering ordinance); Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question Of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L.
REV. 579, 593 (1997) (hereinafter Mears, Connections) (curfew; anti-loitering ordinance);
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1 (curfews, gang- loitering, laws, order-maintenance
policing); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1998) (hereinafter Livingston, Caretaking); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (hereinafter Livingston, Communities).
11
Exemplified by the warrant requirement and a strong reading of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments.
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Role-based conceptions of the scope of authority do not fit with an emphasis
on due process, the warrant requirement, and prospective limits on the power
to police.12 Much like the separation-of-powers limitation upon the various
branches of government, they work to suggest that municipalities should
match the scope of authority conferred upon particular government officials to
the specific set of problems to be addressed through public order policing.
These include vandalism, loitering, noisiness, “cruising,” and solicitation, and
are particularly problematic insofar as they are indicia of drug crime and gang
activity.13 A range of municipal officials other than the police can address
many of these activities. Such officials possess limited institutional legitimacy
outside of their various spheres of operation and no role-based authority to
engage in the invasive, investigative policing practices currently utilized in
predominantly urban areas.
The distinction between rule- and role-based policing helps illuminate some
troubling features of the public-order policing debate. Currently that
discussion revolves around the propriety of endorsing an increase in the
“discretion” devolved upon law-enforcement officers. I suggest that focus on
“discretion” alone — from both sides of the debate — is mistaken, not because
police (should) have or lack discretion, but because social norms scholars,
properly understood, do not wish to give police “discretion.” Rather, they
propose a different source of constraint — local supervision and “social
norms” — premised upon conceptions of police authority, professionalism,
and legitimacy that diverge markedly from the legal liberal model. Once the
normative (as opposed to sociological)14 basis for police authority and
legitimacy is laid bare, it turns out that the debate is over different conceptions
of (constrained) police autonomy, and the solution to problems of policing is
not police discretion but the police role.

12

See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1738
(2005) (“Warrants, in fact, were the principal motif of the Warren Court's approach to the
Fourth Amendment. … Again and again, the Court insisted that, with certain narrow
exceptions, searches and seizures were reasonable only if the police obtained ‘advance
judicial approval’ in the form of a warrant. The point was that judges should decide, not
police officers.”).
13
See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note
1; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593; Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court,
and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 141 (1999); Livingston,
Communities, supra note 10.
14
See Michael S. Moore, Three Concepts of Rules, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 772, 77375, 777-78 (1991). See also Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal
Theory, 52 SMU L. Rev. 167, 193 (1999) (discussing “sociological or psychological
exploration on why people treat legal rules as giving them reasons for actions.”) (citing TOM
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)).
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In Section II, I place the social norms theorists descriptive (empirical or
sociological) account of community perceptions of legal legitimacy into a
normative framework.15 The ability of legal officials to govern depends upon
the assimilation of legal directives into the local social norms structuring an
agent’s choices.16 In the criminal law, social perceptions of legal legitimacy
depend upon the manner in which rational agents understand and internalize
criminal sanctions as part of their general attitude towards other, legal and
non-legal, norms of conduct.17 At the very least, that people endorse a set of
norms tells us an interesting fact — what system of norms is in force in a
given community and so how to tailor new or existing norms to make them
more efficient.18 That sociological fact does not, however, tell us whether
those norms ought to form the basis of a moral, political, or legal theory.19
Descriptive elaboration of local norms does not encompass the full scope of
the social norms theorists’ ambitions: despite the empirical, rational-choice the
nature of much of their argument, they want to discuss not just the appearance
of legitimacy, but actual legitimacy. Their normative claim is that social
norms provide justified, substantively legitimate reasons upon which we ought
to rely independent of the claim made by either the authority or the normsubjects20 — a set of “politically feasible and morally attractive” policies.21
The disagreement between social norms and liberal legal theories rests upon
the attractiveness of the normative claim.
In order to understand the scope of the social norms theorists political and
moral program, it is essential to elaborate the concepts of legitimacy and
authority that underlie the discussion. Accordingly, in Section III I provide a
definition of these concepts, as well as introducing the concepts of rule- and
role-based authority. Each concerns the proper scope of legitimate authority:
rule-based authority has its basis in adherence to the content of particular
15

Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1616 (2002)
(hereinafter Meares, Pollicing). See also Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214
(compliance with norms based on agent’s internal perception of government legitimacy).
16
See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
17
See id. at 1006.
18
See Moore, supra note 14, at 773-75, 777-78. See also Bix, supra note 14, at 193
(discussing “sociological or psychological exploration on why people treat legal rules as
giving them reasons for actions.”) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990)).
19
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 265-67 (2004); Moore,
supra note 14, at 773-75, 777-78.
20
The concepts of legitimacy and justification are normative; they entail a particular, internal
attitude on the part of the law’s subjects. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the
Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 851, 864-65 (2002) (hereinafter Meares, Empiricism); Meares, Place & Crime, supra
note 5, at 670-80.
21
Harcourt, supra note 7, at 179.
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rules; role-based in the powers afforded individuals occupying a particular
status in specified circumstances or jurisdictions. These different justifications
for the scope of legitimate authority explain some of the features of Fourth
Amendment doctrine and the tendency of the Court’s jurisprudence to
“lurch[ ]” between competing visions of the scope of justified authority.22
My central concern is with the legitimacy crisis in policing urban, minority
communities and the social norms response to that crisis. Section IV contains
a statement of the problem and a discussion of the legal liberal and social
norms responses to it. Minority communities face the paradox of under- and
over-policing.23 Differential rates of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
length of sentencing has resulted in a vastly disproportionate number of
minority drug users sent to prison, with a devastating effect upon the human
resources in their communities.24 Drug dealing and gang activity, however,
impose significant burdens on the community, often resulting in a break-down
of public order and a rise in violent crime and property damage that curtails
the quality of life in afflicted neighborhoods. The legal liberal emphasis on
the rights of criminal defendants and constitutionally mandated controls upon
the police does little to ameliorate the plummeting quality of life experience by
urban residents; the legal liberal emphasis on race, poverty and crime fails to
account for differences in criminality experienced by communities with
similar racial and economic profiles.25 Social norms theorists’ claim they can
explain local differences and raise the quality of life through neighborhood
attitudes to government legitimacy.
In Section V, I demonstrate that the social norms project of delegating power
to the police ironically requires more, not less, legislation and the creation of
new, government-generated, rather than local, standards of criminality. Social
norms theorists attempt to legitimate these increased police powers by
involving community members in the process of norm creation.26 This
solution stems from a failure clearly to understand the nature of police
authority and the consequences of removing the few due-process restraints
upon the operation of that authority in the community setting. What is
required is not more police discretion, but a preventative, public order policing
authority limited to that role and precluded by inclination and institutional
22

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ((“our
jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”).
23
See Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1255-56.
24
See Michael Tonry, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 52 (1994).
25
See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675-81.
26
Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 827; see also Meares, Social Organization, supra
note 10, at 220-26 (discussing reverse stings and anti-gang ordinances); Meares, Policing,
supra note 15, at 1612 (same).
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competence from engaging in the type of policing that generates alienation and
resentment from the very groups that are supposed to benefit from an increase
in order.
Police trained to use public order legislation as collateral means of engaging in
investigation and detecting drug crime inevitably go beyond public order
policing when empowered by youth curfew, anti-gang, or anti-cruising laws to
control the mostly minority urban communities that are the prime targets of
public order policing.27 The result is a form of high-stakes policing in which
low-level encounters rapidly escalate into stops, searches, and seizures and in
which possession of small amounts of low-level drugs result in lengthy prison
sentences. The style and consequences of policing often results in a public
perception of institutional illegitimacy, where the minority, urban community
internalizes the style and consequences of policing as race-based and racist.28
In Section VI, I conclude that, given the point and purpose of public order
policing, it is not clear that the police are the proper body to accomplish them.
Community participation in policing — and the crime-control goals touted by
“broken windows” policing — should work at least as effectively (from the
perspective of community participation, more effectively) if public officials
with a more limited institutional role undertake public order policing.
Intriguingly, such targeting does not involve statutes directed against youth,
gangs, or drug dealers: public order offenses are only tangentially related to
these activities. Where groups of young people are orderly and where lowlevel drugs are distributed non-violently and in private houses we are often not
concerned to police them. Experience shows that there is widespread public
tolerance for low-end drug use so long as that use is private and the
community remains orderly. In addition, generally communities not only
tolerate but demand low sentences for public order offenses. Accordingly, the
officials empowered to stop, search, and arrest should not be those engaged in
public order policing, and who are trained to use any encounter as a
justification for initiating collateral, investigative policing as part of the
investigation of low-level drug crime in urban communities.
These
considerations argue in favor of redeploying police away from public order
policing and into the more labor-intensive activity of investigating crimes of
violence and dealing dangerous drugs.

27

See Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol,
1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 141, 173 (1999).
28
See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 680; Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy
and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 413-14 (2000) (hereinafter, Meares, Legitimacy
& Law).
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II. SANCTION- AND NORM-BASED THEORIES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Social norms theories share a distinctive approach to legal analysis, one that is
empirical and contextual,29 concerned to examine non-legal, informal systems
of social regulation. The empirical ambition of the theory is to discover what
government rules and standards people endorse and discern public perceptions
of legitimacy as measured by observable reactions to social and legal norms.30
The social emphasis of the theory is to insist that lay-persons’ conduct is
motivated by non-legal standards even when the law purports to control their
behavior.31 The normative aspect regards social agents as rational beings
capable of directing their conduct by reference to norms.32 So while social
norms theorists consider that the law is an institution able to create obligations
that are internalized by subjects, they attempt to determine the manner in
which a rational agent will understand and internalize the sanction as part of
their general attitude towards other, legal and non-legal, norms of conduct.33
The concept of “internalization” helps explain the relation between empirical
and normative theories and the distinctive, sanction-minimizing character of
the “new” policing.
A. Internal and External Norms
Social norms theories attempt to determine the manner in which a rational
agent will understand and internalize criminal sanctions as part of his or her
general attitude towards other, legal and non-legal, norms of conduct.34 The
social-norms perspective gives weight to the meaning that agents and social
groups place upon legal norms35 and, so the social-norms theorists claim,
mediates individual assessments of value.36 Accordingly, such theories seek to
identify the effect of both the direct threat to impose sanctions and the indirect

29

See, e.g., Meares, Empiricism, supra note 20..
See Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 413-14.
31
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 351 (1997). The law guides conduct by providing “general standards of
conduct, which multitudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as
requiring from them certain conduct when occasion arose.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW at 121 (1st ed.).
32
See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747 (1989);
Neil MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Fact, 17 L. & PHIL. 301, 322-24
(1990).
33
See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1006.
34
See id.
35
See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 55-6 (1st ed. 1990); NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A. HART
30-34 (1981). For a sociological perspective on the internal attitude to rules (phrased in terms
of “context” and “contingency”) see Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2181-83 (1996).
36
See, e.g., Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 359-60.
30
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assimilation of such legal directives into the social norms structuring and
agent’s choices.37
A distinctive feature of the “social meaning” of norms is (in normative terms)
the agent’s “internal” point of view.38 The internal point of view explains the
agent’s particular orientation towards the rule, her “critical reflective attitude”
towards behavior described or justified with regard to that rule.39 From the
internal point of view, norms operate as criteria for the agent’s judgments
governing her decisions about what to do. From the internal point of view, the
norm motivates and justifies conforming behavior.40 Agents manifest the
internal point of view by pointing to the various reasons for following norms
to explain, critique, or justify conduct and would do so even in the absence of
a sanction.41
What is essential to this critical attitude is that the agent accept the norms
structuring the practice as providing a standard of judgment against which
such statements can be compared, critiqued, and justified using such concepts
as “‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and ‘should,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’”42 Without the internal
attitude to the rule (or norm or authority) the concepts of obligation,
justification, and legitimacy are absent from any explanation of our behavior
in conformity with the rule, and the particular type of obligation imposed
remains opaque.43 The normative account, therefore, can explain why people
obey the law and demand conformity from others even when they do not
believe the sanction will be imposed. The contribution of social norm
theorists to the analysis of the criminal law may be represented as a move from
external to internal understandings of the structure of such choices, from an
emphasis on outcomes to social meanings.44
The distinction between internal and external points of view, long familiar to
philosophers of law, is a central plank of the social norms critique of the “old37

See Lessig, supra note 16.
See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 55-6; MACCOMICK, supra note 35 AT 30-35.
39
MACCOMICK, supra note 35 at 30-35. HART, supra note 31, at 54-56.
40
For motivational accounts of the law, see Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference that Rules Make
in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33, 37 (Brian Bix, ed., 1998)
(hereinafter Shapiro, Rules); Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 149, 173 (Jules Coleman, ed. 2001) (hereinafter
Shapiro, Hart); See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the
Practical Difference Thesis, in ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99, 122
(Jules Coleman, ed. 2001).
41
H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (1982).
42
HART, supra note 31, at 56. Hart refers to these terms as part of our “general normative
terminology.”
43
Id.
44
See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1006. See also Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 809815.
38
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style” economic analysis of law.45 Consider, as an example of the external
perspective, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of the criminal law. Posner’s
theory is expressly sanction-based. He claims that the criminal law seeks to
enforce market interactions by making extra-market transactions so costly that
they are unaffordable.46 For a range of criminals, especially the poor,
monetary sanctions may insufficiently deter market-avoiding transactions.47
Accordingly, the state is justified in turning to incarceration given the cost of
deterring, detecting, and punishing crime.48
For Posner, the criminal law provides the public with “prudential” reasons for
compliance with its dictates — a wish to avoid the sanction. The potential
criminal need not agree with the rule or regard it as justified or formally or
substantively legitimate in order to obey it. Rather, the rule provides
information that enables the rational potential criminal to modify her behavior
based upon the likelihood and quantity of punishment.49 But Posner’s theory
fails to provide a means of distinguishing between a punishment for engaging
in prohibited behavior and a tax levying funds for engaging in permitted
behavior.50 As Posner notes, the fine is a penalty consequent to a finding of
legal accountability in either criminal or tort law.51 The difference between
the two, however, resides not so much in the relative ability to pay but in the
“social meaning” of the penalty: how the penalty is understood by participants
in the practice.
In the criminal law, the fine is a sanction or punishment imposed upon a
finding of legal culpability and is generally regarded to justify strong moral
disapproval of the act engaged upon. In the civil law, the fine constitutes
damages imposed upon a finding of liability and may entail no moral
significance whatsoever.52 Where Posner does discuss the stigmatic effect of
45

Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 350; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610 (1998).
46
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195-1204 (1985); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed.
2003).
47
See Posner, supra note 46, at 1204-05.
48
See id. at 1205-14.
49
Such reasons are “epistemic”: they provide information that may help the process of
practical reasoning by stating the consequences of certain options. See Shapiro, Hart, supra
note 40, at 173.
50
See H.L.A. Hart has emphasized the normative significance of the distinction between “an
act which is legally obligatory and punishable, from conduct which is subjected to a tax or
other painful or disagreeable administrative measures.” HART, supra note 41, at 133-34.
51
See Posner, supra note 46, at 1205-14.
52
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1996) (same); Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 69395 (1993) (same).
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the criminal law he presupposes moral condemnation as an additional cost to
be factored into the rational agent’s decision process without suggesting why
doing so would be appropriate or justified.53 To do so would require a theory
that takes into consideration the social meaning of culpability and punishment.
Such a theory would have to take a more or less54 internal attitude to the
practice, and include the fact that in the criminal law the forbidden conduct is
ruled out altogether as wrong rather than tolerated or regulated (though
discouraged) so long as adequate compensation is made.
From the perspective of social norms scholars, authority internalized as part of
the agent’s personal morality is a “powerful normative reason for
compliance.”55 “[T]he individual who complies for normative reasons does so
because she feels an internal obligation to do so,” rather than on the basis of
some external stimulus.56 As an empirical matter, in the legal context
internalized, “legitimate” authority is particularly associated with government
behavior and consists in “an amalgamation of perceptions that individuals hold
of the law and authorities that enforce it.”57 The greater the popular perception
of governmental legitimacy, the greater the likelihood of popular compliance
with the law.58 The likelihood of compliance with a particular government
authority is a measure of that authority’s “social influence.”
The concept of “social influence” is an important one in social norms
scholarship: I suggest it has a normative dimension. From a normative
perspective, an authority has “social influence” when, consciously or not, it
possesses the power to alter an agent’s normative situation by declaring the
agent’s actions legitimate or illegitimate, justified or not.59 Social influence is
thus the normative power exerted by a community authority upon community
norms. Social norms theorists give the concept an empiricist twist; it “is the
term that social psychologists use to describe the propensity of individuals to
conform to the behavior and expectations of others.”60 Clearly, not just any set
of expectations exerts an influence over an individual, so the notion of
authority is intrinsic to the sociological concept. School-teachers, celebrities,

53

See Posner, supra note 46, at 1205-07, 1216, 1223-24.
See, e.g., Bix, supra note 14, at 174; MACCOMICK, supra note 35 at 30-35.
55
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399; Tracey L. Meares, Signaling,
Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal
Law Policy, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 410 (2002).
56
Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1616. See also Meares, Social Organization, supra
note 10, at 214 (compliance with norms based on agent’s internal perception of government
legitimacy).
57
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399.
58
See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 679.
59
Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 813.
60
Id. at 813; see also Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 353.
54
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and mentors may constitute such an authority, but so may a barber or
beautician if their opinions carry weight in the community.61
Because social influence concerns the number of individuals whose behavior
an authority influences and with what strength, if we are to understand the
force and reach of particular norms, we must have some understanding of the
manner in which individuals guide or govern their behavior by authorities.
Here again, the attitudes of subjects are important. An agent might internalize
and endorse a norm as intrinsically valuable or instrumentally legitimate and
be motivated to act accordingly.62 The agent may act for instrumental and
prudential or self-interested reasons, for altruistic reasons, or for no reason.63
Perhaps the agent is governed by fear of criticism to identify as a member of a
group;64 perhaps she does not whole-heartedly endorse the norm, or even think
much about it.
Police behavior is one influence upon the attitudes of citizens to the law. Law
enforcement is one “important indicator[ ] to individuals about how the
authority in question views the group to which the evaluator perceives herself
belonging.”65 So long as the processes are perceived as fair,66 particular
outcomes will not undermine citizen assessments of justified law
61

Social influence is likely to be greater the more easily that influence can be disseminated
across the community. In social norms literature, “norm-highways,” systems for the
communication of norms to different members of the community represent the “connections,
or social networks, among adults in a community,” the “multiple, overlapping relationships
among a community's residents,” across which “obligations and expectations . . . are
transfer[red].” Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583, 858. These relationships include
“friendship networks, community-wide supervision of teen peer groups, and . . . participation
in formal organizations,” id. at 585, including churches and parent-teacher associations. This
network of overlapping relationships constitutes a “social infrastructure,” Meares, Policing,
supra note 15, at 1064; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 676, the stability and
robustness of which “will either facilitate or hinder the transmission of community values that
can support law- abiding behavior.” Id. The existence and relative health of such a social
infrastructure does not, however, indicate that the norms it transmits are ones that promote
law-abindingness; the norms transmitted “may facilitate crime as well as prevent it.” Meares,
Policing, supra note 15, at 1064.
62
See Shapiro, Rules, supra note 40, at 36. Authorities may have different degrees of social
influence dependant upon the range of attitudes entertained by the authorities’ subjects. An
individual may regard an authority as intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. Intrinsic value
entails that the authority is valuable in itself — it is good, just, etc.; instrumental value entails
that it is valuable as a means to some other end — for example, it is able to coordinate
behavior by setting rules that others will follow. Individuals may entertain prudential or
motivational attitudes to following instrumental authorities. Prudential attitudes regard the
authority as providing information about the manner in which others will react to conduct;
motivational ones regard it as providing an independent reason for acting in a particular way.
63
See HART, supra note 41, at 266-67.
64
See McAdams, supra note 31, at 351.
65
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03.
66
See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214.
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enforcement.67 Police practices may thus feasibly exert a great deal of positive
or negative social influence in urban communities. One goal of social norms
scholarship is to analyze and develop ways of creating the conditions by which
to increase the local police’s positive social influence and support norms of
law-abidingness.
B. Social Norms Justifications of Disparate Policing of Urban
Communities
Some theorists, most notably Bernard Harcourt and Robert Weisberg, have
(correctly) chosen to critique the concept of social meaning as underdeveloped
in the social norms literature.68 I would suggest that the theory of social
meaning in fact does double duty: it not only accounts for certain normative
concepts (such as obligation, authority, and legitimacy), but also generates a
sociological description of the shared beliefs of certain groups or communities
to explain their response to legal and non-legal norms as justified or
unjustified.
Social norms theories can be read as a double-barreled critique of accepted
understandings of criminal law scholarship.69 Such scholarship rejects the
classic, Henry Hart-style description of the criminal law “method”:70 the belief
that criminal law is an enterprise in governance through general “directions,”71
addressed to norm subjects who are liable to sanction for disobedience.72
Internal attitudes to norms explain how the criminal law can operate in the
absence of a sanction, and helps redirect the focus of criminal law scholars on
low-level as well as high-stakes crimes. The new scholarship also dismisses
67

Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03.
Harcourt, supra note 7. Harcourt criticizes the superficial construction of social meaning.
Id. at 180-84. For a more nuanced and in-depth investigation of social meaning among gunusing youths and gang members, see Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth
Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities, 24 CRIME & JUST. 105 (1998). Another possible
criticism of the social norms concept of social meaning is that it has ignored the tradition of
continental phenomenology and hermeneutics which could supply some much-needed depth.
See Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law
Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 476-77 (2003) (“[social meaning] is the
most elusive and troublesome term in this new [normative criminal law] enterprise.” See also
Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State:
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 328-40 (2002).
Anthony Honoré is the principal legal theorist in the analytic tradition explaining norms in
terms of group membership. See TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL (1987).
69
See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261
(2003).
70
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 402, 40306 (1958).
71
Id. at 403.
72
Id. at 404.
68
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traditional rule of law constraints on enforcement practices as improperly
focused on law-breakers and insufficiently attentive law-abiding citizens in
failing, high-crime communities who demand more and different policing to
secure a decent quality of life.73
Social norms scholars seek to shift our assessment of the criminal law’s impact
away from criminals and onto communities generally described by some
relatively small locality, for example “the neighborhood.”74 Social norms
scholars focus on insiders rather than outsiders;75 law-abiders rather than law
breakers;76 public order issues rather than major crimes;77 and local
experimentation rather than centralized standards.78 They tend to emphasize
discretion rather than legalism and rule-of-law issues.79 A central claim is that
the inclusion of certain shared, local norms in the policing calculus is
sufficient to justify enforcement practices. Police sensitivity to social norms
justifies the rejection of broad checks on their discretion and empowers urban
communities able to participate in criminal legislation and enforcement.80
Social norms theories are especially powerful in explaining urban crime. The
norms they are interested in are social (shared by groups of people) and local
(shared by geographically discrete communities). Social studies reveal that
differences in crime rates among urban communities are not explained by
poverty or race, but by the disparate degree of social or normative cohesion

73

See, e.g. Simon, supra note 7, at 7-10; 48-74; see also Kennedy, State & Criminal Law,
supra note 3, at 1255-56.
74
See, e.g. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Meares &
Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5.
75
Harcourt, supra note 7.
76
Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593 (describing the use of curfews and antiloitering ordinances to isolate lawbreakers from law-abiders).
77
Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1343, 1347
(1998); Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224.
78
Meares, supra note 77, at 1348-49; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224;
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5.
79
For a general discussion of social norms theories, see Simon, supra note 7, at 21-26; 47-71;
For a bibliography of these theories, see id. at 6 n.4.
80
See, e.g. Livingston, supra note 74; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; Kahan &
Meares, Crisis, supra note 1. Empowered participation as feature of “democratic
experimentalism” more generally; see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, DRUG TREATMENT COURTS AND EMERGENT EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNMENT, 53
VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen
Participation and Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 615,
618-623 (2001) (hereinafter Fung, Beyond & Below); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy:
Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POLITICS & SOC. 75103 (2001).
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existing in the disparate communities.81 Where community members share
social norms that promote law-abiding behavior and are transmitted through
local institutions, perceptions of government legitimacy are high and crime
rates are low.82 Where the community shares few norms or local institutions
for transmitting them, social cohesion and perceptions of government
legitimacy breaks down and crime rises.83 The distinctive claim of social
norms theorists, then, is that the manner in which crime rates vary from
locality to locality depends upon the degree of normative cohesion within the
community rather than on the traditional indicia of wealth, class, or race.84
Even in poor, urban, predominantly lower class and minority neighborhoods,
norms theorists identify the most significant predictor of community
criminality as the normative dissonance or cohesion of the various
communities.85
There are a variety of potential sources for normative dissonance, but three in
particular stand out in the criminal law literature: the fragmentation of norms;
apathy towards or the outright rejection of the government as a source of
legality; and the government’s active signaling of an anti-community stance.86
The problem is not normatively cohesive communities, whether antagonistic
or not. Because “[l]egitimacy… is rather uniquely in government control,”87
the government can evaluate and control public perception of its behavior by
the way in which “the legal process, in both its formal and informal aspects,
signals to members of a social group how their group is perceived by

81

See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997)
(hereinafter, Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, Neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson, & W.
Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory, 94
AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 774-802 (1989); Robert J. Sampson, & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch,
Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: Neighborhood Context of Racial
Differences, 32 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 777-804 (1998); Robert J. Sampson, & Janet Lauritsen,
Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk
Factors, in A. REISS & J. A. ROTH, EDS., UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE:
SOCIAL INFLUENCES (1994); Robert J. Sampson, & William Julius Wilson Toward a Theory
of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in J. HAGAN & R. PETERSON, ED., CRIME AND
INEQUALITY (1995). These articles are cited in Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8;
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1.
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Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1606; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at
224; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 591-92.
83
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 581.
84
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675-81.
85
Id.
86
id.
87
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399. See also Lessig, supra note 8, at 665
(noting that new Chicago school rejects idea that law is of marginal significance to social
control).
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governmental authorities.”88 For social norms scholars, the task in cohesive
communities is to align local norms with enforcement norms so as to promote
law-abidingness.
The problem, both empirically and normatively, is community fragmentation:
the lack of any “common values”89 sufficient to establish “cohesive” standards
of conduct transmitted across shared “social networks.”90 Fragmented
communities are distinguished by a lack of “[c]ollective supervision over and
personal responsibility for neighborhood problems”;91 members of the
community embrace a “hands-off” approach to criminal behavior,92 resulting
in a state of virtual chaos in which any and all conduct, social or anti-social,
may be regarded as justified.93 By contrast, “[c]ohesive communities are
better able to engage in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of
crime than communities that are not cohesive.”
A community experiences normative fragmentation when the system for
transmitting and enforcing norms breaks down. Two types of entity are
implicated here: the “social infrastructure”94 comprised of intersecting
associations between persons or organizations that enable communication of
norms to different members of the community;95 and authoritative institutions
with the “social influence”96 to alter or enforce social norms. Fragmented
communities lack the “connections, or social networks, among adults in a

88

Meares, supra note 55. Perceptions of governmental legitimacy, according to the
sociological theory, are engendered through a variety of interactions between citizen and
state, ranging from low-level stops or searches by the police up to participation in the
legislative process. See, also Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 680; Meares,
Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 413-14. Across this spectrum, the manner in which the
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816.
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Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 673.
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Id.
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See Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583 (discussing free-riders in social
communities).
93
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675.
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Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1064; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 676.
95
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pervasive and familiar phenomenon in our economic and social life: namely, that individuals
tend to conform their conduct to that of other individuals.”); see also Meares & Kahan,
Norms, supra note 8, at 813.

16

ROLE-BASED POLICING
community,”97 the “multiple, overlapping relationships among a community's
residents,” across which “obligations and expectations . . . are transfer[red].”98
The solution to localized differences in crime rates, according to social norms
theories, is increased and differential policing in communities that were
traditionally ignored and undervalued by the police.99 The goal is to replace
signals indicating government disinterest with those expressing government
interest,100 and to empower law-abiders and disempower law-breakers.
Among social norms scholars there is a degree of disagreement over
appropriate styles of policing. They all generally approve the sort of flexible,
“broken windows” public order policing that comports with the community’s
tolerance for street-level disorder — pan-handling, loitering, etc. — through
targeting “known” disruptive individuals and places, to undermine the ability
of anti-social influences to organize and associate.101 Debra Livingston,
however, favors a range of civil injunctions and criminal ordinances targeted
very precisely upon specific individuals and behaviors.102 Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan favor increased civility on the part of the police combined with a
series of local laws, such as youth curfews, and police practices, such as
reverse stings, that are inherently general and expressive of neutrality over a
broad range of individuals. In effect social norms scholars propose a form of
police zoning based on normative cohesiveness or dissonance, such that
communities comparable as to race, class, and location receive highly
disparate quantities and qualities of police attention.
III. AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY, RULES AND ROLES
Social norms theories are part of the liberal reaction to the effect of the War on
Drugs on minority communities. The War on Drugs is directly responsible for
the massive increase in incarceration over the last twenty years.103 Both the
97

Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583.
Id. at 585. These relationships include “friendship networks, community-wide supervision
of teen peer groups, and . . . participation in formal organizations,” including churches and
parent-teacher associations. Id.
99
See, e.g., KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3.
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See Livingston, supra note 74, at 586.
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See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223; Kahan & Meares,
Crisis, supra note 1; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593.
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Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 13; Livingston, Communities, supra
note 10.
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See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr ., The Burdens And Benefits Of Race In America, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 228 n.45 (1998) (comparing disparate sentencing of blacks and
whites for possession of same weight of cocaine); CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR
IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL 193-94 (1996) (suggesting that The war on drugs has
disproportionately imprisoned African American men, at a terrible cost to the black
community); Tonry, supra note 24, at 52 (charting the “foreseeable disparate impact on
Blacks” of targeting cocaine usage). See also Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A “Second
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1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act104 “increased
the tendency toward punishment,”105 first by targeting drug dealing, then by
targeting drug users. 106 The rates of arrest and incarceration have had a
striking effect on the prison population: “In the federal prisons…drug
offenders constituted 22 percent of admissions in 1980, 39 percent in 1988,
and 42 percent in 1990.”107
The burden of arrest, prosecution, and conviction has disproportionately
impacted African American men, at a terrible cost to the black community.108
Most notorious among the provisions were the draconian punishments for
possession of crack cocaine.109 Its disparate impact is felt both in the style of
policing and in the rates of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.110 It is
primarily responsible for the increased rates of arrest, conviction, and
incarceration of African and Latino Americans in the last twenty years.111
Liberal legal and social norms theorists differ profoundly, however, in their
characterization of acceptable policing standards. This difference, I will
suggest, turns on two ways of creating and limiting the scope of police
authority: through rule-based or role-based justifications. I shall first discuss
two different types of authority: institutional and social. Institutions, in the
relevant sense, are internally related systems of norms; institutional authorities
are those empowered by the norms of an institution to engage in
(institutionally) specified conduct. Social authority is simply any exercise of
Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1485-86 (2000) (“The
dramatic increase in African- American incarcerations has resulted from congressional
attempts to stop the devastating epidemic of crack cocaine.”).
104
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4231 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §801 (1988)).
105
William D. Mccoll, Comment: Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory And
Practice In An Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 475 (1996). See also DAVID GARLAND,
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 118,
132 (2001) (describing the War on Drugs as an event that “utterly transformed law
enforcement in the USA”).
106
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108
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authority not endorsed by an institution. Exercises of authority that are
institutional from one perspective may be social from another: thus, the
chairman of a golf club is an institutional authority from the perspective of the
club, and social from the perspective of the legal system.
Both liberal legal and social norms theories concern the institutional authority
of the police; each provides a different account of the source and scope of
legitimate police authority. Where liberal legal theories’ claim that police
authority is legitimate derives from institutional norms and is limited by the
content of those norms — which I shall call “rule-based” authority — social
norms theorist claim that we should recognize certain social norms as
conferring legitimacy upon police. Instead of rule-based justifications of
police action, social norms theorists emphasize the functions and circumstance
justifying police action — what I shall call “role-based” authority.
A. Authority and Legitimacy
Authority and legitimacy are normative concepts.112 An authority is an entity
that possesses a normative power over another; that is, the ability to change an
agent’s reasons for action, either by creating protected reasons or overriding
conflicting protected reasons.113 The authority does so by replacing an agent's
own reasons for action with authoritative reasons. The authority claims the
power to govern an agent's actions and to exclude the agent’s own reasons for
action or for action on the balance of reasons.114
Legitimacy consists in the valid exercise of authority115 and may have a formal
and a substantive component. Substantive legitimacy entails that an authority
is fully justified, by some evaluative standard, in the exercise of authority.116
Thus, a norm is substantively legitimate when the authority correctly assesses
the facts and values motivating the act of norm-creation as having positive
worth. Formal legitimacy requires that the process by which an authority
creates, changes, or extinguishes norms is accepted as valid by those entities
empowered to execute or enforce the norms.117 Formal legitimacy — which
might be thought of the due-process model of legitimacy — requires only the
partial justification of authority: it is primarily a feature of institutional
112

Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 3, 10 (1979)
(“Authority is a practical concept. This means that questions of who has authority over whom
are practical questions; they bear on what one ought to do.” ).
113
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS at 101 (1990).
114
See id..
115
Raz, supra note 112 at 12-18.
116
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS AND THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN 212-14 (1994).
117
See, e.g., HART, supra note 41, at 266-67; see also JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 155
& 155 n.13 (1979)
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systems such as the law.118 As is by now familiar in legal theory, formal
legitimacy does not entail substantive legitimacy: an authority may create
norms in a formally legitimate manner, yet those norms may not be fully
justified by the relevant (moral, political) evaluative standard.119
Institutional systems share two features: first, they are systematic because the
norms of the system are “'internally related”;120 and second, they are
institutional, because select officials or bodies are responsible for enforcing
the system’s norms. H.L.A. Hart's discussion of law as a system of rules,121
famously elaborates the systematic quality of institutional systems. He
distinguishes between primary and secondary rules, where primary rules are
duty imposing, specifying what conduct is permitted or prohibited, and
secondary rules regulate the recognition and change of, and adjudication using,
primary rules.122 For rules to form a system the primary rules must be
supplemented by secondary rules.123 Secondary rules identify what the rules
of the legal system are, how they can be changed, and how any disputes
arising from them can be settled. That is, they specify what sort of internal
relations the rules of a legal system can take.
Joseph Raz elaborates upon Hart's description of legal systems by emphasizing
the role of legal institutions. Raz, who is primarily concerned to develop an
account of institutional authority, suggests that a definitive feature of
institutional systems is the presence of some official or body that derives its
authority from its role in applying the norms of the system.124 Applicative
officials are both bound to apply the norms of the system and empowered to
do so in a manner that is, from the point of view of the organization,
authoritative and final upon the subjects of the norms.125 That power is
118

Formal legitimacy requires only that the norm-creating act of an institutional authority be
justified according to the evaluative criteria employed by the institutional system. These
criteria may not be fully justified, that is, substantively legitimate.
119
See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REV. 178 (1984)
120
Raz, supra, note 113 at 111-3.
121
See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at, 2-3.
122
Rolf Sartorius rightly notes that Hart’s discussion of primary and secondary rules in fact
makes two kinds of distinction between primary and secondary rules, see Rolf Sartorius,
Hart's Concept of Law, in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, 131, 131-41 (Summers, ed.,
1971); however, the duty-imposing and recognition-change-adjudication distinction is the one
appropriate to Hart's discussion of the systemic character of law.
123
Secondary rules “may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they
are about such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that
individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary
rules themselves.” HART, supra note 31, at 92.
124
Unless the norm-applying institution has the power to change the rules of the system.
125
For more on law as an institutional system of norms, see RAZ, supra note 113, ch. 4;
JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM chs. 6 and 7 (1990); NEIL MACCORMICK
AND OTA WEINBERGER, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW (1986); Neil MacCormick, Law
As Institutional Fact, 90 L.Q. REV. 102 (1974); Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and the
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formally legitimate so long as it follows institutional constraints upon official
decision-making; it is substantively legitimate if the decision is “the right thing
to do.”126 Police officers are, according to Raz, one such type of applicative
body; courts are another.127
1. Two Types of Authority
Limitations on the institutional authority of various bodies or officials —
courts, judges, police, etc. — go beyond the justification of the source of
authority as formally or substantively legitimate. Authority may also be
limited by scope: the extent of the authority’s jurisdiction to act. Constraints
upon the scope of authority may be rule-based and role-based. I shall call the
scope of authority “rule-based” if it is constrained by the substantive content
of a pre-existing norm. I shall call the scope of authority “role-based” if it is
constrained by the nature of the authoritative office.
The scope of rule-based authority is determined by the content of a primary
norm.128 For example, the familiar rule, “No vehicles in the park,” limits the
scope of the official’s authority in the following way: only an object that
counts as a vehicle may be excluded from places identifiable as a park. The
official may not use that rule to, e.g., enter a private dwelling. Once the
official acts outside or against the content of the primary rules the issue of
legitimacy — the range of actions within the scope of the official’s
institutional authority — arises.129
The scope of role-based authority is determined by the authority’s status in
relation to the subjects of authority and the circumstances in which the
authority acts. In an institutional system, role-based authority is governed, not
by the content of primary norms of the system, but by secondary norms
specifying the types of action or decision the official is entitled to undertake in
specified circumstances. The Judgment of Solomon provides a familiar
example.130 In his role as king, Solomon had authority to adjudicate those
disputes his subjects brought before him. In this particular case, his ruling —
Institutional Theory of Law, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE, Beiheft 14, 117 (1992). But see Simpson
arguing that no such thing as legal system
126
In terms of justification: a substantively legitimate decision is fully justified “all things
considered”; a formally legitimate decision is partially justified because some reasons are
excluded from consideration.
127
RAZ, supra note 113, at 136.
128
See HART, supra note 31, at 94. Primary norms are those designed to control conduct.
129
Such a view fits comfortably within most modern liberal trends in legal political theory,
and receives its strongest modern expression in the thought of Wechsler. See Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)
130
Another is Adam Smith’s “ideal spectator.” See ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS III.4.2 (1759) (1976); see also Eric J. Miller, “Sympathetic Exchange:” Adam
Smith and Punishment, 9 Ratio Juris 182 (1996).
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to bisect the subject of a custody dispute — was not authorized by the content
of any primary norms. The outcome — revealing the biological mother, who
was willing to give up her child to save its life — depended upon the rolebased scope of Solomon’s authority: he had the right to settle their dispute, as
manifested in the biological mother’s acceptance of his decision.
One might consider that role-based authority entails the presence of discretion:
it consists, after all, in the absence of primary rules of conduct.131 Rules can,
however, contain such a grant of discretion — for example, to determine what
is “reasonable” conduct. Nonetheless, a reasonableness standard can, as we
shall see, be applied in a more or less role-related manner: more, where the
standard of reasonableness depends upon features intrinsic to the individuals
status or role or defined by extra-institutional norms (e.g,, rules of ethics,
administrative guidelines) fleshing out the content and purpose of the role;
less, where there is reasonableness depends on features possessed by everyone,
no matter what their status. Role-based authority thus depends upon more
than the mere indeterminacy of rules requiring further elaboration: it depends
upon the nature of the individual or office and the circumstances in which that
individual or office is required to operate. In an institutional system, this
would be to argue that something about the nature of the office and its relation
to the system legitimates substantial discretion over a range of circumstances.
For example, the “articulable suspicion” standard has become one role-based
characterization of the police officer’s authority: so long as the officer’s
training and experience furnishes her with some reason for stopping a suspect,
she may do so by virtue of her role as an officer of the peace.132 In such
circumstances, the scope of her authority need not be limited by the content of
some primary rule that she enforces, but by her general role in preventing or
responding to actual or threatened disturbances as determined through her
training and departmental guidelines.
Both rule- and role-based authority may be legitimated in the same way. If
both are institutional authorities, they obtain institutional license to act based
upon the propriety of the formal process by which their office and, in the case
of rule-based authority, by which the primary norm to be applied, was created.
In institutional systems, the source of rule-based authority derives from the
formal process of norm-enactment; the source of role-based authority derives
from the nature of the authoritative office. The source of their authority is
131

Role-based authority thus entails the absence of both “conduct” and “decision” rules,
where decision rules are content-based norms specifying what considerations an authority
ought to weigh in determining how to decide a case or course of action. See Meir DanCohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-31 (1984).
132
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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independent of the content of their authority: that is, their pronouncements will
still be authoritative even if wrong.133
2. Rule- and Role-Based Conceptions of Policing
One of the established ways of understanding the scope of police authority to
interfere with private conduct is Herbert Packer’s famous contrast of two
conflicting models of police practice: the crime-control and due-process
models of criminal procedure.134 Both legal liberal and social norms theories
may be understood, as I have suggested elsewhere,135 as a modern embodiment
of the due-process and crime-control models.136
What I call legal liberal and Packer calls “due process” critiques of the
criminal justice system emphasize role-based principles of proportionality and
individual dignity. The individual’s rights are respected and expressed
through prospective, adversarial, court-regulated constraints upon the
executive discretion to investigate, detain, and search suspects.137 Criminal
defendants are afforded significant rights and protections, including rights
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. The presumption of
innocence and the burden of proof establish core limits on governmental
power.138
Social norms theories comport more closely with the crime-control model,
organized around the principle of repression of antisocial conduct. Crime
control affords the executive branch wide discretion in pursuing and
133

H.L.A. Hart suggests that reasons for action are content-independent if they are “intended
to function as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done.”
Hart, supra note 41, at 254. Differently put, content-independent justifications are
intransitive. Transitive justifications are those in which A justifies B, and B justifies C, and A
justifies C. Intransitive justifications are those in which A justifies B, and B justifies C, but A
does not justify C. For various discussions of intransitivity, see JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF
FREEDOM, 325-326 (1988); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS at
67-8 (1995). And see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy; Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L.
REV 2121, 2148-51 (1990).
134
See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-23
(1964).
135
See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1479, 1504-1512 (2004).
136
See Packer, supra note 134, at 1-23.
137
See id.
138
See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (H. Schwartz, ed., 2002); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Yoav Sapir, Keeping Gideon’s Promise through Public Defender Offices: The
American and the Israeli Experiences (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). See
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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prosecuting criminals; accordingly, it places great trust in the police’s capacity
to determine which suspects are guilty or innocent.139 Norms scholars reject
court-enforced legalism and rule-of-law constraints upon law enforcement in
favor of highly discretionary forms of policing designed to reflect a sensitivity
to social norms.140 This style of policing is facilitated by a legislative agenda
creating series of highly interventionist regime for enforcing public order,
designed in part to enable the police to isolate degenerate social influences
from the rest of the community.141
a. Rule-based Policing
One source for the liberal legal concern with executive enforcement of the
criminal law was the growing perception, through the 1950s and 1960s, of the
then-current practice of law enforcement as akin to “set-thief-to-catch-athief.”142 Until Mapp v. Ohio,143 police investigation had been dominated by a
“crime control model” that afforded the executive branch almost unlimited
discretion in pursuing and prosecuting criminals.144 The crime-control model
limited or delayed the use of formal procedural checks on the government’s
use of that discretion;145 minimized substantive distinctions between
defendants on the basis of race or economic or social status; “and exhibit[ed] a
large degree of confidence in the government’s identification of suspects as
guilty of the crime with which they [we]re charged.”146 Investigative
procedures tended to concentrate upon the person of the accused as “the most
likely and accurate source of that information.”147 Confessions were the prime
source of evidence and the evidentiary barriers to obtaining such confessions
139

See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1479, 1505 (2004).
140
See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 74, at 640-45; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8;
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1.
141
On social norms and interventionism, see, for example, Meares, Connections, supra note
10, at 593 (promoting curfews, gang-loitering laws, and order-maintenance strategies). See
also Meares, Place And Crime, supra note 5, at 695 (same); Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra
note 8; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1160-66. Isolation from degenerate social
influences is a major feature of the social norms movement. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note
74, at 640-45 (discussing curfews and civil injunctions to exclude gangs from law-abiding
neighborhoods); Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593.
142
See, e.g. Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735.
143
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
144
See Packer, supra note 134, at 1-23.
145
Packer calls such checks “ceremonious rituals.” Id. at 159.
146
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 224 (1983) (“crime control ideology
suggests that criminal procedure should function exclusively to punish the guilty. It values
fair process norms primarily for their instrumental tendency to promote good ‘results’”).
147
Raneta Lawson Mack, It's Broke So Let's Fix It: Using a Quasi-Inquisitorial Approach to
Limit the Impact of Bias in the American Criminal Justice System, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV., 63, 70 (1996).
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were few if any.148 In particular, the police use of the “third degree” —
beating prisoners — to obtain confessions posed a significant worry.149
The administrative discretion afforded the police went hand-in-hand with the
racial and social segregation of local forces. Often, the police served as
instruments of state repression, enforcing express and implicit norms of
segregation.150
It is almost commonplace by now that much of the Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence during the middle part of this century was a
form of race jurisprudence, prompted largely by the treatment of
black suspects and black defendants in the South. The Court's
concern with race relations served as the unspoken subtext of many of
its significant criminal procedure decisions.151

Prior to Mapp, then, most policing could be characterized as lacking much
state and any federal regulation.152 The police were the recipients of a massive
grant of discretion through the absence of any express rules specifying
appropriate conduct or establishing appropriate values. Where there was some
form of regulatory scheme placing limits on conduct such schemes were
transformed, through the lack of effective sanction, into a license.153 What
148

Id.
“From their inception, modern police forces have been plagued by the twin problems of
corruption and brutality… The sort of ‘excesses’ to which the police have regularly resorted
both on the street and in the stationhouse — beatings, torture, false arrests, the third-degree,
and the like — are well-documented.” Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 834, 836 (1994) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 152-53 (1993); DAVID R. PAPKE, FRAMING
THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CULTURAL WORK, AND THE LOSS OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, 18301900, 122 (1987); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (1980); ERNEST J. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE: A STUDY OF THE
UNLAWFUL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW (1931)). See also Livingston, supra note 74, at 56566 (discussing police corruption as a significant problem for the police as traditionally
constituted).
150
See Livingston, supra note 74, at 593 (“police practices that were imbued with persistent
hostility to the poor, to dissidents, and especially to racial minorities.”).
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David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 316 (1997) (citing Robert M. Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982); Steiker,
supra note 149, at 841-44); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67
MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968)).
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Before incorporation of the Fourth Amendment, the federal Constitution would of course
apply only to the federal government, and so the primary target of fourth-amendment
regulation was the F.B.I.
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See Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 119, 124 (2003) (hereinafter Kamisar, Defense); Yale Kamisar, Remembering
the “Old World” of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
537, 559 (1990) (hereinafter Kamisar, “Old World” Criminal Procedure). Kamisar notes that
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (NY App. Ct. 1926), which established the New York State
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changed was the discovery or re-conceptualization of the police as possessing
a “distinctive mentality” and forming a “discrete and unified group”154 with its
own set of race- and class-biases. This understanding of the police as an
administrative agency that had supplanted the values of democratic
government, expressed through the Equal Protection Clause, with its own
discriminatory and anti-democratic animus, formed the bedrock of the Warren
Court’s “revolution in criminal procedure.”155
The problem with law enforcement, on this picture, is the familiar one of
unelected officials — in this case the police — displacing or replacing
legislative will by interpreting and enforcing the law according to their own
personal values or preferences.156 The institutional and individual autonomy
of the police, combined with a shared and pervasive discriminatory and antidemocratic attitude, generated a widespread distrust in liberal commentators
and the Court.157 The legal liberal solution should be understood as an
executive correlate to the “neutral principles” doctrine developed to constrain
judicial discretion.158 Liberals sought to replace the degenerate values of the
self-regulated criminal justice system with “a fair and dignified legal
process,”159 one that “treats all criminal suspects with dignity and respect.”160
Where the police institutionally or individually interjected their own

law on the admissibility of illegally seized evidence applicable prior to Mapp, was ignored by
executive officials unaffected by the exclusion of tainted evidence.
154
Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735.
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See, e.g.,Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (dating the revolution as lasting from 1961-1967 at
the latest); see also COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 5.
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See Weschler, supra note 129.
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Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6.
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See Weschler, supra note 129. According to Wechsler, neutral principles are
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pre-existing, legislated (and in the context of constitutional interpretation, constitutional)
values. See id. at 16; see also Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral
Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984); Felix
Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934,
49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935); Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism
(Review of Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 VA. L
REV. 889, 898-99 (1999).
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the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1138 (1987). Arenella asserts
that “A public trial, if fairly conducted, sends its own message about dignity, fairness, and
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146, at 203, 219.
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Arenella, supra note at 146, at 190. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460
(1966) (“the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is
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state or federal
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conceptions of proper social relations into the process of policing,161 the
remedy was to remove this source of bias and require the police to adhere to a
rule-based system of values antecedently established by the legislature (or
founders of the Constitution), as monitored by the courts.
Henceforth, the power of the police was to be constrained by the content of the
primary rules of criminal procedure stated in and developed out of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment as well as other rules of appropriate conduct
promulgated by legislatures and courts.
Accordingly, legal liberals
emphasized formal judicial oversight beginning at the pre-trial process162 so as
to control, in part, illegitimate class- and race-based police discretion and
remedy substantive class- and race-based differences between defendants.163
This process bears all the hallmarks of rule-based constraints upon police
authority: the rejection of individual autonomy in favor of authority extending
only so far as the content of the primary norms would permit. The fact that
these primary norms were addressed to the police is precisely to the point.
Many of the major liberal reform proposals exemplify the rule-based approach
to constraints on police authority. For example, Anthony Amsterdam, in his
discussion of the proper basis for the justification of Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule,164 suggested that the propriety of executive law enforcement
practice should be measured by conformity to express standards of conduct
enacted by legislatures (either state or municipal) or by the police themselves
(as a set of administrative rules).165 These norms would set the content of
executive procedure — how police and prosecutors are to interact with the
public — and so limit the scope of police authority. Such rules have the
advantage of increased transparency, such that the community is aware of the
norms of conduct governing their interactions with the executive.166 “Police
rulemaking would bring [such norms] to visibility not merely for the police
command but also for the community. Departmental rules would be subject to
a kind of scrutiny by the community and by local police organs.”167
161

Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1734-6.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (“searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-deliniated
exceptions.”).
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See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law,
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See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1973-74).
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Id. at 416-25.
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See Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 667, 681 (1972)
(stating that “visibility of rulemaking process is its greatest virtue”).
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Amsterdam, supra note 164, at 422. “The individual police officer . . . would be inclined
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Amsterdam stresses that legislation is “a deliberative process [of] community
consultation and . . . community scrutiny.”168 An open consultative process
preceding legislation followed by public promulgation of the posited rules
broadcasts “the fact, the agent and the content of decision-making [and] tends
to ensure that the decisions which are made will conform to the community’s
standards of justice.”169 Such a process, though not required by the Fourth
Amendment, exhibits the rule-based virtues of legislative supremacy and
deference to government.170 Absent a participative legislative process and
clear rules, legal liberals claim, differential policing and prosecution practice is
— while not determinative of executive animus — indicative of executive
disregard for the targets of policing.171
b. Role-Based Policing
Relatively quickly, however, policing and with it the attitudes to policing,
experienced an overhaul. Changes in selection and training, resulting in a
force that is both more diverse and more professional, transformed the Court’s
perception of the police.172 Rather than a source of disorder, the police have
become the solution to problems of public order and high crime.173 Under the
current regime, so long as police enforcement activities are “reasonable” given
the officer’s understanding at the time she acts, her activity will generally
survive fourth-amendment scrutiny.174 This change in emphasis from rules to
reasonableness, I shall argue, transforms the basis for the scope of police

thoughtfully the impact and propriety of various courses of action open to him. He would be
both more accessible and more receptive to community input . . . and he would stand to be
judged and questioned by the department and the community upon irrefutable evidence of the
content of the decision he had made.” Id. at 424.
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Id. at 425.
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Id. at 427.
170
See Laurence H. Tribe, Erog .v Hsub And Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its
Hall Of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170, 231, 231 n.243 (2001) (discussing virtues of
accountability and transparency); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 17-3 at 1684 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that mode of interaction sets appropriate limits on
executive direction of social organization).
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authority from rule-based to a role-based: it is by virtue of the official’s status
as police officer that she has the power to act in the specified circumstances.175
One major feature of the shift in attitudes to the police is the advent of an
administrative approach emphasizing the liberal-bureaucratic values of
rationality and efficiency in law enforcement.176 The police now, for the most
part, share the same values as the citizens they protect and are not
characterized, by the Courts at least, as a race-biased and anti-democratic
institution. The exercise of police power is not an act of race-based thuggery
but is rather directed by training and professional know-how. The police are
skilled experts in investigating and controlling law-breaking conduct: they are
required to make context-dependent and pressured decisions in rapidly
evolving and potentially dangerous situations to ensure public safety, restore
order, and apprehend criminals.177 The problem is no longer replacing a set of
informal and illegitimate values with ones that are express, prospective,
formal, and legitimate.178 The interposition of autonomous police values in the
process of law enforcement poses no challenge to democracy because police
and people (or at least courts) share the same set of understandings.
Nowhere is this transformation — from the rule-based and autonomyconstricting response to police bias to a role-based and autonomy-promoting
approach — more striking than the development of Terry v. Ohio’s
“reasonable suspicion” standard.179 Terry, which purportedly marks the end of
the Warren Court’s “revolution in criminal procedure,”180 was among the first
cases after Mapp to question the warrant requirement and to spark a battle over
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Its legacy was to transform a unitary
understanding of seizure — the arrest — and the singular probable-cause
evidentiary requirement into one that is multiple and particularized. Each
seizure can now be distinguished by different amounts of police coercion and
justified by discrete evidentiary requirements, may be of greater or lesser
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Two of the few other articles considering in depth a role-based account of the police are
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1228-29 (1999); Elizabeth
E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004).
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See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 74, at 565-66; Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6.
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See Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder In New York, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000) (race-based police stops justified
in “case law as the sound exercise of ‘professional judgment’ by police officers.”)
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According to David Sklansky, the courts have a set of pro-police “shared understandings”
around the values underlying policing, understandings that are no less powerful for being
premised upon a legal fiction. See Sklansky, supra note 151, at 303, 320-23.
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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See Kamisar, supra note 155, at 4.
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duration, and may permit various types of collateral searches or removal the
suspect’s person from the scene.181
David Sklansy argues that we should regard Terry, not a grant of discretion,
but as limitation upon it.182 Terry in fact constrains the police power to stop
and frisk by requiring some “articulable suspicion” sufficient to withstand
(admittedly subsequent) court scrutiny rather than simply the individual
officer’s hunches or vague suspicions.183 This moderately rule-based approach
to Terry did not survive. Now, almost any non-prohibited justification that can
be articulated will suffice to provide reasonable suspicion,184 and does so
because such reasons operate precisely to characterize the police as welltrained, experienced experts responding to “imponderable evidence” of
criminality.185 The articulation of reasons displays the officer’s role-based
qualifications and legitimates the officer’s role-based expertise.
As Carol Steiker notes, by exporting Terry’s reasonableness requirement into
various ad-hoc exceptions to the warrant requirement the Burger and
Rehnquist courts managed, in a bloodless coup, to overturn the rule-based dueprocess approach of the Warren Court.186 The Court’s change in approach was
181

See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, “Seizures” Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 417-18 (1984)
(formerly one-dimensional approach to seizure now multi-dimensional).
182
See Sklansky, supra note 151, at 315-16.
183
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27; Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6.
184
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion); Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
185
See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2001). The
Austrian-English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested that it is just such
imponderable evidence that forms the basis upon which “experts” exercise their judgment.
See id.; Ray Monk, How to Read Wittgenstein 99-106 (2005). The notion of imponderable
evidence has its correlate in the emphasis on “experience” or “training.” See Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 273 (“reviewing courts should … look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each
case … This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them
that “might well elude an untrained person.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996) (suggesting that “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police
experience and expertise” and discussing range of otherwise innocuous facts that will justify
the suspicion of a well-trained officer); Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 6 (discussing contribution of
training to establishing articulable suspicion); Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“Any one of these factors relied upon by the Miami police may have been as
consistent with innocence as with guilt; but the combination of several of these factors is the
essence of both ‘articulable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause.’”); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980) (‘it is important to recall that a trained law enforcement agent
may be ‘able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly
innocent to the untrained observer.’”).
186
See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting there are
at least twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement and that “[o]ur intricate body of law
regarding ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ has been developed largely as a means of
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predominantly a matter of “style”187 and procedure,188 a move from
“prophylactic”189 rule-based constraints to a more fluid role-based series of
considerations.
The Court accomplished the reasonableness counterrevolution without overruling Warren Court precedents. 190 Where the Warren
Court expressed a special distrust of the police, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have generally expressed empathy.191
The result of this procedural “counter revolution” is a Fourth Amendment
often characterized as “inconsistent and incoherent,”192 “an embarrassment,”193
and “filled with apparent contradictions.”194 I believe, however, that the
current state of Fourth Amendment law might profitably be reconsidered as
expressing a conflict over rule-based versus role-based constraints. On my
reading, Terry has been transformed from a rule-based limitation upon police
power controlled through the requirement of express justification into a rolebased grant of authority.
For example, Phyllis Bookspan argues that “the reasonableness approach
focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the people.”195 Where
a rights focus invites a rule-based approach, the Court’s reasonableness
creating these exceptions, enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment
‘search’ and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement.”).
187
Carol S. Steiker, Counter- Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2492-93 (1996).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of consent searches: while, in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), both Justices Douglas and Marshall adopted a suspect
focused and rule-based model of authority in adopting the Ninth Circuit’s worry that “a
reasonable person might read an officer's ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand
backed by force of law,” id. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 289 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1973), the majority’s officer-focused and rolebased model of authority exhibits no such concern. In fact, a focus on the investigative role
of the police — dependant as it is upon an ethics of autonomy — has created a mirror image
of the reasonable officer in the reasonable and robust citizen, sufficiently self-reliant to resist
police imprecations. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). This is, as Sklanky notes, a
legal fiction, Sklansky, supra note 151, at 320-23; it operates as an “understanding,” id. at
303, or, as Steiker would say, at the level of a decision rule (whether the decision is to trust
the police and require a certain fortitude on the part of the public in police-public
interactions); and is at the root of much investigation “outside” the Fourth Amendment’s
purview.
192
Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474 (1991).
193
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994)
194
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 881910 (1991).
195
Bookspan, supra note 192, at 477.
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analysis has generally “eschewed bright-line rules … [o]r ‘litmus-paper
test[s]’ or single ‘sentence or ... paragraph ... rule[s]’ … or per se rule[s].”196
The touchstones of the reasonableness analysis are role-based considerations
of context,197 status, and purpose:198 the “endless variations in the facts and
circumstances” translated through “experience” or “training,” into the police
decision to search or seize.199
Role-based understandings of the scope of authority are concerned to identify
the range of activities suited to the official’s institutional or social status — in
the case of the police, criminal investigation. Role-based justifications thus
extend beyond the regime of institutional rules (if there is any) creating the
office to encompass non-institutional, administrative or customary
understandings of the role.200 This change in attitude is profoundly important
for the manner in which courts will agree to scrutinize conduct and hold the
police accountable. A court (or other decision-maker) asks how that sort of
agent would act in circumstances that trigger her role. Put simply, role-based
authority concerns the circumstances and purposes that empower an official to
act (the secondary rules of a legal system) rather than (primary) norms, the
content of which define the scope of legitimate authority.201
196

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567 (1988); Royer, 460 U.S. 491; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Schneckloth, 412
U.S. 218).
197
See Royer, 460 U.S. at 506; see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983).
198
See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The opinion nonetheless, in
my view, betrays a mind-set more useful to those who officiate at shuffleboard games,
primarily concerned with which particular square the disc has landed on, than to those who
are seeking to administer a system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of the
guilty and the vindication of the innocent.”).
199
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699; Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 6; Royer, 460
U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563-64.
200
Non-institutional, of course, from the legal perspective. The Court rejected holding law
enforcement to account through their administrative and role-defining procedures in United
States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470, 470-71 n.2 (1973). On Robinson and police
procedure, see Amsterdam, supra note 164, at 414-5.
201
Carol Steiker relies upon Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between decision and conduct
norms to explain the manner in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts eviscerated many of
the protections of the Warren Court. See Steiker, supra note , 2470-71, 2533-3540 (1996);
see also Meir Dan-Cohen, supra note 131, at 626. I believe that Dan-Cohen’s distinction
between decision and conduct norms is somewhat confusing: at some points he appears to rest
the distinction upon the norm’s addressees; at other points it appears to be a distinction
between mandatory norms and power-conferring norms. Id. at 626-635. Furthermore, he
suggests that there can be “acoustic separation” between decision and conduct norms, such
that the Court’s power to apportion responsibility can be totally separated, as a conceptual
matter, from the legislature’s power to pre- or proscribe conduct. Id. at 626. For a variety of
reasons, I reject the notion of acoustic separation between decision and conduct norms as
either possible or desirable, I believe decision norms send a message about — or in social
norms terms, send a signal about the social meaning of — acceptable conduct.

32

ROLE-BASED POLICING

Role-based authority is thus focused on the (institutional) agent in the context
of action — performing the job with which they have been entrusted, given the
circumstances and appropriate level competence. It concerns issues of
professional identity and ethics rather than a morality of rights and duties. The
Court evaluates the decision to act based upon “whether the[ ] historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount
to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.”202 Under the reasonableness
standard, the Court focuses on contextual triggers, changing circumstances,
and pragmatic responses to the problems presented by the investigative
process. The Court has removed a variety of impediments to the officer’s
performance of her job, sometimes on the basis of inconvenience or danger,203
sometimes as essential to the very possibility of following up on investigative
hunches,204 sometimes because to do otherwise would lead investigating
officers to disregard the law.205
B. Social Norms and Role-Based Policing
Social norms theorists embrace role-based police autonomy and agency, and
propose to empower policing through a legislative program using low-level,
substantive criminal laws to undermine those antisocial activities constitutive
of disorder.206 If the police are to be constrained, it is through their selfregulated sensitivity to neighborhood mores that help them to determine what
type and levels of order different communities prize.207 Accordingly, social
norms scholars are, to a considerable extent, concerned with the impact of
policing on neighborhoods and communities evaluated through local, social
norms.
As a substitute for the punishment-oriented War on Drugs, social norms
theorists suggest a variety of policing practices designed to promote order and
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Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690.
See Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 110-11 (1971) (danger of deliberate or
accidental hazard on stopping automobile justifies bright-line rule permitting officer to order
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I take this to be one of the underlying rationales for consent searches. See Robinette, 519
U.S. at 39-40 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567; Royer, 460 U.S. 491; Bostick, 501 U.S. 429;
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See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (“If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to
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See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223-24.
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Livingston, Communities, supra note 10.
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enable adult supervision of local youths.208 Reverse stings, youth curfews,
anti-loitering ordinances,209 and laws addressing automobile cruising and
aggressive panhandling,210 civil injunctions and civil sanctions,211 are enforced
across diverse communities, in part to spot and punish outsiders, often from
more socially affluent communities.212 Adult authority is enforced by the
variety of measures designed to remove youths from the streets and prevent
them accumulating in intimidating numbers or public spaces; particular
individuals — gang members and other crime-seeking outsiders — may be
identified and prevented from entering the community.213 This municipalgovernment emphasis on local, neighborhood organic solidarity214 expressed
through policing demonstrates the virtues of neutrality, absence of bias, and
respect for law-abiders necessary to encourage local perceptions of police
legitimacy.215
For social norms theorists, the emphasis is not on criminal procedure and
norms of police conduct, but on substantive criminal laws directed at the
public. From this role-based perspective, primary rules — curfews, loitering
ordinances, and the like — operate not to constrain police power but to expand
it. Social norms scholars want to create new, low-level crimes (or targets of
policing) and in so doing facilitate a new, preventative role for the police that
requires not only freedom from geographically or jurisdictionally broad
constraints upon localized interpretations of the manner in which the norms
are to be enforced (through local guidelines and local community-police
partnerships) but also a positive creation of a range of new (low-level) powers
to police otherwise innocent conduct, justified by participative community
self-regulation. The real debate is not about discretion but the creation of a
slew of low-level crimes that extend the grounds for stopping and searching
pedestrians for reasons only collaterally related to the envisaged social
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note 10, at 591-92; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1.
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See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10.
215
See Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal, & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1195 (2004); Meares, supra note 55, at 412-13; Meares, Legitimacy
& Law, supra note 28, at 403-04.

34

ROLE-BASED POLICING
harm.216 That concerns, not rule-based limits upon the scope of police
authority to search and seize citizens, but the criminalization of everyday life:
not criminal procedure, but substantive criminal law.
Refocusing the debate on autonomy rather than discretion explains a puzzling
feature of the social norms posture — the oddity of demanding discretion
when the police already have it in spades.217 As David Cole notes:
In fact, the courts are quite hospitable to police discretion, as a result
of a host of decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that have
substantially undermined the constitutional protections of the Warren
Court era. Thus, although the [social norms] scholars … sometimes
talk as if they are calling for radical change, in fact their arguments
are more aptly described as an apology for a sea-change that has
already taken place in constitutional criminal procedure.218

These rules vest individual officers or departments with considerable
discretion to determine to select as a target of investigation.219 They permit the
police to engage in a variety of encounters, including “mere…questioning”220
or examining the individual's identification,221 and others deemed
“consensual,” including requesting to search luggage,222 without requiring the
police to warn suspects of their right to refuse consent, all of which avoid
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.223
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William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2153-54, 2154
n.53 (2002) (“The key exception to the warrant requirement is the one for searches incident to
arrest. [Citation omitted]. That doctrine allows the police to search the person and
belongings of anyone who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a crime.
Since crimes can include such things as traffic offenses, [citation omitted], this power gives
the police the ability to search, without a warrant, almost anyone in a vehicle, plus (depending
on the stringency of local curfews and quality-of-life ordinances) a large portion of the
pedestrian population to boot.”).
217
Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1060.
218
Id. at 1062.
219
“These rules allow the police to approach and investigate people for any reason or none at
all; the officer's discretion is wholly unregulated. In other settings, the officer's discretion is
subject only to the most deferential oversight, as in ‘stop and frisk’ encounters, which may be
predicated on ‘reasonable suspicion,’ a standard that itself defers substantially to the officer's
on-the-scene judgment and experience.” Id. at 1072.
220
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5-6.
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See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (1984); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.
222
Royer, 460 U.S. at 501.
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See id. at 497 (“law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is
willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to
listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such
questions.”).
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That oddity stems, I would suggest, from a confusion between discretion
(which I have suggested consists in the absence of rule-based constraint) and
role-based authority (which consists in a power to act). The Fourth
Amendment debate revolves around the presence or absence of constraints
upon intrusions upon individual privacy. What social norms scholars seek,
however, is something more than the absence of constraint; they are, in fact,
happy with certain forms of local limits on executive discretion and generally
seek to minimize the intrusive styles of policing that lead to arrest and
incarceration. Rather, they propose a separation of investigative and
preventative roles to empower the police to take on preventative policing.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Many inner-city communities suffer from what might be called a crisis of
legitimacy; norms that support law-abiding behavior are rejected or ignored in
favor of norms supporting law breaking. Government institutions are regarded
with suspicion or disdain and community members regard state-sponsored
efforts to enforce the criminal law as motivated by malign racial and class
stereotypes. Crime rates are high.224
Other inner-city communities, though equally poor or with similarly large
minority populations do not experience this type of crisis. Although sharing a
variety of social and economic problems in common with other impoverished,
urban, predominantly minority communities, these neighborhoods do not have
runaway crime rates and are much more self-regulating than the law-breaking
ones.225 They accept the government’s right to posit new norms and tend to
endorse the norms independent of their content.226
I claim that the legitimacy crisis in the criminal law depends upon justified
public perceptions of a disjunction between the formal and substantive
legitimacy of certain laws and policing practices. In this section, I begin by
distinguishing legal liberal accounts emphasizing rule-based formal legitimacy
from social norms accounts that highlight role-based substantive legitimacy.227
My claim is that rule-based legitimacy cannot provide an adequate response to
recent discussions of the race- and class-neutral animus behind formally
224

Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5.
Id. at, 676 (suggesting that “both structural organization and cultural organization in
neighborhoods help to explain the crime that occurs in them.”).
226
Reasons are content-independent if they are “intended to function as a reason
independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done.” Hart, supra note 41, at
254; see also RAZ, supra note 133 at 35.
227
Simon, supra note 7, at 7-10; 48-74 (contrasting liberal legal emphasis on “analytical,
individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and corrective…[r]ights…derived
analytically by the application of legal reasoning to authoritative sources” with legal
pragmatism of social norms theorists).
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legitimate norms endorsed by social norms theorists. Neither, however, can
participative local empowered democracy justify substantively illegitimate
laws. Accordingly, the limits of democratic governance engender problems of
accountability and control at both legislative and executive levels that neither
theory can properly accommodate.
A. Differential Enforcement, Policing, and Legitimacy
It is common ground between social norms and legal liberal theorists that
unjustified differential enforcement of the law across communities adversely
impacts both the fact and perceptions of governmental legitimacy.228
Sometimes it appears that there is no such thing as “criminal law,” and that the
law as applied depends upon the whim of law enforcement officials — police
and prosecutors — empowered to interpret, apply, and refuse to apply properly
legislated norms.229 At other times it appears that the police target some
communities for heightened attention for malicious or discriminatory
reasons.230
Within such “target” communities, moreover, the police may use public,
invasive investigation and enforcement mechanisms, such as youth curfews
and stop-and-frisk searches.231 This style of policing frequently fails to
distinguish adequately between criminal and non-criminal, such that lawbreakers and law-abiders alike are stigmatized as criminal by the law.232 This
disparate impact on different communities, and on law-abiding individuals in
those communities, undermines public respect for the law.
As a result, a number of legal liberal scholars have denounced the “overpolicing” of inner-city communities as antithetical to their wellbeing.233 A
central link between traditional and modern liberal legal critiques is to
characterize current policing as relatively unconstrained by prospective
legislation234 and to explain differential enforcement across communities as
consciously or unconsciously racially motivated and so formally
illegitimate.235 Many liberal legal scholars have gone further to equate the
differential legislative impact of the War on Drugs on poor and rich, minority
228
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and majority, with some form of class- or race-based animus.236 Proponents of
a race-based analysis claim that even if the government is not consciously
motivated by race in developing legislative or executive norms,237 it is careless
of the foreseeable consequences of its legislation and in particular it impact on
the African American community.238 The argument is then that such
legislation, given its disparate effect on people of color, is an illegitimate
expression of “unconscious racism”239 and “malign neglect.”240
To
demonstrate animus, this:
antisubordination approach to equality would not require Black
defendants to prove that the prosecutions are motivated by racial bias.
Rather than requiring victims to prove distinct instances of
discriminating behavior in the administrative process, the antisubordination approach considers the concrete effects of government
policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged.241

The anti-subordination principle would therefore require only a showing of
disparate impact to render a statute illegitimate.
Substantively onerous impacts, however, need not derive from conscious or
un-conscious race-based motives.
Rule-based theories depend upon
controlling police conduct by excluding illegitimate bias agent autonomy
through deference to the legislated norms. If the problem does not reside in
executive bias then the legal liberal worry about illegitimate race- or classbased animus does not exist, and the rule-based solution — replace caprice
through legislation and remove autonomy through closely scrutinized
prospective formal rules — will not help.
1. Race-Neutral
Outcomes

Legislation

236
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Race-Specific
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“unconscious racism,” “the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.” Charles R. Lawrence,
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
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Randall Kennedy has provided a forceful critique of the claim that
“unconscious racism” explains the real motivation of such legislation. That
critique is, I claim, consistent with the concept of formal legitimacy. He
conditions a finding of illegitimacy upon some showing of governmental racial
animus. That a distinct group bears the burden of a particular piece of
legislation need not, he suggests, be explained by racism. Race-neutral
reasons may equally well explain the legislation.242
The charge of racial animus, Kennedy has argued, is a weighty one that plays a
particular role in discussions of legislative legitimacy.243 Demonstrating the
racial animus of legislation requires more than a disparate effect on people of
color, even against a (historical) background of discriminatory social norms.
What more is required is a means of linking these background norms to the
foreground of legislation and enforcement. Race-neutral legislative or
executive norms may result in race-specific disparate impacts. Such an impact
may be legitimate and justified — it may stem from the legislator’s belief that
crack cocaine impacts minority communities in a manner that is different in
kind to powder cocaine, and that the remedy of mass incarceration is necessary
and tolerable to remedy the situation.244 Where some communities are more at
risk during a drug epidemic, extreme measures may in fact be justified as to
control the situation, despite our ability to foresee the detrimental collateral
effects of such a policy.245 Kennedy points out that many African American
lawmakers supported the drug laws.246
Put simply, Kennedy notes that racial animus operates, under our
constitutional structure, to render the legislative process illegitimate.247 So
understood, racial animus is a “canceling condition”248 that negates the formal
legitimacy of the legislative process; absent racial animus, however, the
242

See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs,
supra note 2 at 1798.
243
See Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1418-19 (1988).
244
See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs,
supra note 2 at 1798.
245
On foreseeability as an argument against the crack laws, see, e.g., TONRY, supra note 1, at
4-5, 123.
246
See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs,
supra note 2 at 1798.
247
Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1255-56. This procedural account of the
Equal Protection Clause comports with Paul Brest’s description of the “anti-discrimination
principle” he takes to underlie its operation. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976) “The antidiscrimination
principle fills a special need because — as even a glance at history indicates — racedependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate
considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial
groups or on the related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference.” Id.
248
See RAZ, supra note 113.

39

ROLE-BASED POLICING
process, so long as otherwise proper, is legitimate. Kennedy further notes that
legitimacy and justification are independent.249 Many of the individuals who
supported the crack cocaine legislation believed disparate sentencing laws
were substantively justified given the effect on the urban, minority
communities they represented.250 That they no longer feel this way is
indicative that the law’s underlying justification no longer applies.251 It does
not, however, mean that such laws are formally illegitimate. As Kennedy
himself notes, “being wrong is different from being racist, and the difference is
one that matters greatly.”252 Because courts are primarily empowered to
pronounce only upon formal legitimacy, they are obliged to uphold the
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine absent a showing of
racial animus during the legislative process. The issue of justification is,
according to Kennedy, for the legislature to determine.253
But where formal legitimacy in the process of enactment is accompanied by
subsequent substantive illegitimacy, due-process critiques lack a proper target.
Where the focus is on the propriety of a piece of legislation, a race-based
legitimacy crisis arises only if there is some race-based procedural impropriety
during the enactment process manifested on the face of the statute or through
some showing of animus.254 Absent such a showing, neither the content of the
law nor its disparate effect is properly discussed in terms of legitimacy.255
Indeed, Kennedy suggests, historically, it is the lack of enforcement that
indicates racial animus: the police have, for race-based reasons, ignored the
African American community to the latter’s detriment.256 The increased
policing of the African American community in the wake of the War on
Drugs, and particularly the emphasis on crack cocaine, suggests that
enforcement agencies are finally acting in a non-racial manner. Instead of
ignoring minority communities, the police are at last treating them equally, in
the same manner as white communities.257
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The absence of conscious or unconscious animus when enacting the legislation
removes the rule-based claim that the legislative branch was illegitimately
motivated by improper considerations. During the legislative process, the
government and the community are animated by a shared set of values. That
consensus subsequently disappears; nonetheless, given that the rule-based
account of the scope of authority precisely demands adjudicative and
executive deference to formally legitimate norms, the law enforcement
apparatus is denied authority to ignore the law. The only solution to a
substantive mistake or change in circumstances is to re-legislate the law.
Given that a formally legitimate statute may turn out to be substantively
unjustified, the problem is what to do then. The solution recommended
through the anti-subordination principle — that the statute be deemed formally
illegitimate once disparate impact on the basis of race is proved — cannot be
justified as a claim of discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious. If a
race-neutral mistake in calculating the impact of the statute is to have the
effect of a procedural flaw in its enactment, that claim properly must be
understood as demanding a thoroughgoing program of redistributive justice
based upon the effect of neutral laws on minority communities.258 I am not
opposed to such a program: like Professor Kennedy, however, I believe we
should be clear that the justification for such a program does not stem from
deliberate racial animus.
2. Race-Neutral Policing with Race-Specific Outcomes
Kennedy’s race-neutral theory of motivation also applies in the realm of
executive enforcement. Liberal legal rule-based control depends, remember,
upon legislative and adjudicative distrust of the police force’s capricious
substitution of malign enforcement norms for formally legitimate ones.
William Stuntz, Kennedy’s Harvard colleague, has, however, provided a raceneutral justification for the disparate impact of precisely those policing
practices that worry liberal legals. If successful, such a justification would
appear to similarly undermine the potency of the rule-based critique.
Stuntz’s analysis depends in part upon distinguishes communities by the type
of crime committed in “upscale” and “downscale” communities. Two features
in particular distinguish rich from poor crime; the crimes themselves and the
level of “institutional” organization required to support the crimes. The poor
engage in burglary and auto theft; the rich embezzle and engage in insider
258
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trading.259 Poor crime requires networks to receive, launder, and distribute
stolen goods; rich crime does not. Poor crime thus requires a criminal
community and a criminal market in order to work efficiently; rich crime does
not. Poor crimes are relatively institutionalized, with different people holding
a variety of normatively structured positions in the criminal enterprise; rich
crimes are much more atomistic.260
Where crime is socially structured (by social networks or markets), destructive
of the fabric of community cohesiveness, and conducted in the open, practices
that involve prominent invasions into everyday behavior may be
appropriate.261 Where crime is atomistic, less harmful to the community’s
fabric, and conducted behind closed doors in the criminal’s office or home,
more discreet practices are required. Class bias does not render such
difference formally or substantively illegitimate so long as the different types
of crimes, rich and poor, are qualitatively distinct. If rich and poor crime is
properly incomparable across social and geographic communities, then
different enforcement practices are substantively justified given the
community-specific and location-driven availability of more or less private
spaces for crime.262
It is worth emphasizing that, for Stuntz, differential enforcement need not be a
product of racism (and therefore formal or substantively illegitimate) but of
class differences that produce or exacerbate substantively legitimate
differences in policing rich and poor communities.263 This is as true for drug
crime as for other socially and economically stratified crimes. Sociological
features of the disparate drug-using communities,264 however, engender
divergences in the organization of drug markets in upscale and downscale
communities.265 Differences in the quality and price of different drugs stratify
the market by class; thanks to social features of urban poverty, class
stratification entails racial stratification.266 Accordingly, the difference in
policing public, socially structured and private, atomistic communities has a
racially disparate impact.
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Thus, despite similarities in the type of crime, the different communities
experience different quantities and qualities of law enforcement based upon
the relative expense and availability of policing strategies. Where the drug
market remains indoors and atomistic, investigation proceeds by means of
electronic surveillance and targeted busts; where it is public and social,
investigation relies on stop-and-frisks.267 Furthermore, upscale users tend —
through necessity or choice — to find their drugs through social networks of
suppliers, dealers, and buyers in downscale communities.268
This again is to insist upon the shared values of the police and the
communities they police. Both wish the neighborhood to be rid of drug
dealers and free of violence. Accordingly, the police choose the most effective
means to police public spaces, and that choice is determined by considerations
derived from their professional expertise and expressive of tactical efficiency
rather than malign race- or class-based values. In other words, the rule-based
charge of bias and caprice will not stick. Instead, role-based considerations
justify the tactics chosen.
Nonetheless, because there is some overlap between markets,269 race-neutral
motivations in the style of policing and minority populations are internalized
by minority target groups as intentional; such perceptions are reinforced by
different enforcement techniques that, in the poor, urban communities in
which many minority targets live, interfere with the daily life of the lawabiding as well as law-breakers.270 These non-normative discrepancies thus
obtain, by virtue of their translation through internalization, a negative
normative impact that undermines the legitimacy of the drug laws and the
government that enforces those laws.271
The charge that race-based
differences in enforcement are the product of racial animus is thus wrong as a
matter of fact, but understandable: thanks to the social stratification of many
communities by class and race, that perception of illegitimacy is exacerbated.
3. Social Norms, Local Participation, and Public Order
Policing
Social norms theorists agree with the legal liberal contention that, prior to the
Warren Court revolution in criminal justice, the police were often animated by
institutional or individual racist caprice.272 Law enforcement officials used a
variety of vaguely drafted public order laws to discriminate against minorities
267
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and answered to a political bureaucracy that was itself segregated and
segregationist.273 Social norms theorists accept that the Warren Court was
correct to be skeptical of police discretion operating as a cover for
discrimination and to engage in a rule-based limitation upon the scope of
police (and lower court) authority.274
Times change, however. Nowadays both the police and the municipal
administrations to which they answer are integrated and often run by
minorities.275 The problem is no longer racially motivated executive discretion
but, first, the lengthy sentences imposed for drug crimes and, second, drug
policing targeted upon poor, urban, minority communities already struggling
to cope with a variety of other social issues.276 The solution is to curtail a
policing style aimed at arrest and incarceration, and in its place develop a style
designed to control the sort of open-air, low-level anti-social behavior
common across racially diverse communities.277 The goal is to facilitate direct
engagement between local government and the neighborhood community, so
as to strengthen community bonds to enable neighborhoods to police
themselves. Public order policing encourages “law-abiders to engage in
behavior — from patrolling the streets, to cooperating with police, to
transmitting law-abiding values to youths — that themselves suppress crime.
The same effects can likely be achieved by cooperative alliances between the
police and community associations.”278
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From the social norms perspective, legitimacy inheres in local endorsement of
police practices rather than formal adherence to the letter of the law.279 The
desires of the community — for public order, for an increased police presence,
to remove gangs and control delinquency, and generally improve quality of
life — are fundamental. The goal is to empower adults through formal and
informal regular interactions — styled as “friendship networks”280 —
supporting public displays of law-abidingness and emphasizing acceptable
limits on public conduct,281 and bolstered in this effort by the police.282 Broad
anti-discrimination principles are matched by strong discretion at the local
level to enable enforcement to target particular individuals, places, or
practices.283 Local participation by minority residents in endorsing such
strategies enforces the presumption of anti-discrimination and includes local
communities in the creation and enforcement of the law,284 “enhanc[ing] the
cultural organization of a community around law-abiding behavior.”285
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In this form of “empowered democracy,”286 policing operates to enable and
persuade individuals to engage in the promotion of public order, and in turn
participates in and is legitimated by local formal and informal social
networks.287 Central to this enterprise are public attitudes of trust in the police
and belief that they are enforcing the law in a neutral and respectful manner.288
Social norms theorists are thus concerned with police legitimacy as
demonstrating impartiality and engendering public confidence in lawenforcement. The emphasis is on persuasion rather than punishment.289
Sanction-based regimes are antithetical to creation of trust and destroy the
fabric of already fragile at-risk communities.
This vision of law-enforcement legitimacy has formal and substantive
elements. It is formal where the creation or maintenance of legitimacy is
process-oriented, dependent upon local participation in developing lawenforcement norms and a reciprocal attitude of respect from the police. It is
substantive because what is proposed is a “new politics” of local “empowered”
or “deliberative” democracy justifying the various measures designed to
enhance law enforcement.290
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The goal is to create “preventative partnerships”291 in which police enlist
community help in responding to crime rates and adapting to the new realities
of crime. So long as the police partner with the community to create
substantive criminal law or identify the targets of policing, then discretion is
appropriately constrained. As NYU Law School criminologist David Garland
describes, in his magisterial discussion of changes in policing and punishment
over the past thirty-five years, the buzz words for this form of organization
are: “‘partnership,’ ‘public/private alliance,’ ‘inter-agency cooperation,’ ‘the
multi-agency approach,’ ‘activating communities’…and the ‘co-production of
security’”:292 all of these emphasize that crime control requires a joint effort,
whether between criminal justice agencies themselves, or those agencies and
the public. Hand in hand with this emphasis on pooling of resources is a focus
on responsiveness and reflexivity, both at the institutional and community
Throughout this changed approach to crime control, state
levels.293
organizations retain a certain primacy, but operate to steer, rather than carry
out, the functions of crime control: “[t]he state’s new strategy is not to
command and control, but rather to persuade and align, to organize, to ensure
that other actors play their part.”294
Local community participation at the point of legislation — creating the
various local ordinances and other “laws on the books” used to establish youth
curfews or enjoin pan-handling — that the police then enforce, is formally
legitimate in that participation in the legislative process is insufficient to
ensure that the norms as legislated are substantively justified.295 Police
reciprocation and respect at the point of enforcement also provides a formally
legitimate justification: it is independent of the substantive outcome296 and
depends upon the manner in which the government interacts with its citizens
or the larger groups to which they belong or with which they identify.297
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Social norms theorists often provide what appears to be an aesthetic goal for
executive encounters with the public: the police embark on a “charm
offensive” in which they are more “polite” to arrestees,298 in order to replace
signals indicating government disinterest with those expressing government
interest299 and to persuade communities that they are being policed for their
own benefit.300 Substantively legitimate programs of community policing,
however, require more than polite interactions between police and public
during their various encounters on the street. Rather, preventative partnering
requires some more thoroughgoing effort to generate community interest and
facilitate police-public interactions. This is more than a matter of mere
politeness: it requires a revolution in police civic engagement.301
B. Reframing the Issues
The problem facing liberal legal theories depending upon a due-process
critique is that the lack of animus at the input-end of both legislation and
enforcement renders the process of legislating and policing formally
legitimate. From a rule-based point of view, the police and the courts are
required to follow the law. So long as there was no procedural impropriety in
the law-creating process, the substantive moral, political, economic, etc., effect
of the law is immaterial. Any challenge to the law must usually rest upon the
procedure by which it was enacted, not the value of the norm as enforced. The
absence of animus operates to undermine the rule-based, legal liberal claim of
illegitimacy.
The problem facing facing Kennedy and Stuntz, as well as social norms
theorists, is, however, twofold: first, as a sociological matter, the communities
perceive differences in enforcement as unjust; and second, as a normative
matter, these differences are in fact be substantively unjust: the assumptions
underlying both legislation and enforcement have changed to such a degree as
no longer to provide a full justification for the laws.
It turns out that the addictive quality and crimogenic effect of crack is little
different from powder,302 and the remedy of mass incarceration is
intolerable.303 The justifications for disparate penalties on crack cocaine users
298
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— an exercise in moral education;304 “that crack use inevitably destroyed the
lives of those using it”;305 that the use of crack “was expanding beyond the
ghetto” into the white community;306 “that blacks as a class may be helped by
measures reasonably thought to discourage [crack use]”307 — no longer
apply.308 The only reason that appears to explain the continued attitude to the
drug policy is a race-based one.309
The liberal emphasis on disparate outcomes identifies a real problem; the
different interests and priorities of the legislative and target communities. The
latter does not experience the brunt of the enforcement practices, negative or
positive, and so remains free to ignore them. Accordingly, the formal
illegitimacy inheres, not in some race-based animus motivating legislation and
enforcement, but in the discovered substantive illegitimacy of that legislation
combined with a formal inability to cure the substantive problem. If the
process is illegitimate, that is not due to motivational animus but “democratic
domination” of the target community by some other group — a group that
does not care what happens to the target community and refuses or neglects to
re-legislate the malign, illegitimate norms.310
This malign neglect presents a serious legitimacy problem: if the law is in fact,
illegitimate, why should anyone follow it? It would be morally wrong to do
so, unless the weight of some (moral) obligation to obey the law trumps the
public’s obligation to avoid committing a moral wrong.311 Although the police
and courts are required to enforce formally legitimate norms, the public’s
obligation to obey the law is dependant upon the substantive legitimacy of the
laws that are enacted.312 If the government does not repeal a law it knows is
substantively illegitimate, that suggests — as a sociological and evaluative
matter — that the government is willing to act immorally. And if the law is
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targeted only at particular citizens, the government acts in a doubly
illegitimate manner by enforcing substantively unjust norms in a formally
discriminatory manner.313
The existence of a legitimacy crisis thus hinges on the trumping of formal
legitimacy by substantive illegitimacy sufficient to undermine some general
public respect for the legal system. For a discrete patchwork of communities
throughout the nation, the government has, through disparate police practices
tied to a history of racial discrimination, already forfeited that respect and is
now (paradoxically) trying to regain it through the disparate enforcement of
unjustified and substantively illegitimate laws.314
Both Stuntz and Kennedy acknowledge the difficulty of finding some effective
solution to the legitimacy crisis. They adopt the approach recommended by
President Grant on the occasion of his First Inaugural Address: “Laws are to
govern all alike — those opposed as well as those who favor them. I know no
method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their
stringent execution.”315 Stuntz expressly and Kennedy more qualifiedly
endorse a leveling up of crime enforcement so that rich, suburban whites are
policed in the same manner as poor urban African Americans. I, however,
believe as a practical matter that such an approach is politically unlikely and
normatively unnecessary.
Social norms theories face a slightly different objection. They rely upon
indicia of increased local minority participation to justify the process that
produces youth curfew and anti-gang ordinances. There is, however, a
somewhat complex relation between legislation, law enforcement, and
legitimacy. Even at the local level, the crime-ridden neighborhood may be
separated from the body politic in a variety of ways, including flight of the
more affluent members of the community, school zoning, and incarceration —
all of which reduces the crime-ridden community’s social and legislative
capital (and places in question the motives of the fleeing, zoning, affluent
community).
As Kennedy316 Mears,317 and others have noted, the African American
community is not a monolith: “the stereotyping of African Americans
generally, and African American men in particular, as criminals leads to
distrust within communities — Reverend Jesse Jackson is not unique among
313

See Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6.
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African Americans in fearing victimization by young African American
men.”318 Social and class differences may separate geographically proximate
and racially comparable communities.319 Those who bear the brunt of crime
may not be those who bear the brunt of policing, and vice versa. Rather, it
may be more affluent communities on the fringes of disorderly ones — the
“next-door” neighborhoods —that are able to legislate laws targeted at the
neighborhood level.320
Youth curfews and anti-gang ordinances are, on this explanation, popular
because they reflect adjoining, relatively affluent beliefs about their next-door
neighborhoods. The perception of poor urban youth as inherently dangerous
then justifies the targeting of such individuals by the criminal justice system,
although better, more effective policies may be available. Fear of next-door
neighborhoods may militate against social welfare policies because the target
community is characterized part of the undeserving poor.321 That judgment in
turn depends upon the social norms used to categorize and evaluate such
communities as using the crime-centered assessments of risk, deviancy, and
desert.322
Both the legislative and executive formal elements of legitimacy, however,
depend upon substantive considerations of reciprocity between government
and citizen. Under the notion of empowered democracy,323 the law, if it is to
be substantively legitimate, depends upon a reciprocal attitude of respect from
the government combined with group participation in a neutral legal
process.324 Reciprocity indicates that the government takes seriously the
citizen’s participation in the process. At the level of legislation, the process is
substantively legitimate if it does in fact maximize public participation in the
318
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creation and enforcement of criminal-law norms through a fair and inclusive
process. The goal of the process is to increase formal legitimacy through more
and devolved participation in the regulatory process, and so increase the
underlying substantive legitimacy of the institution. But, it bears repeating, a
formally legitimate process of legislation by a substantively justified
institution may still produce substantively unjust outcomes, whether
deliberately or through neglect.
Paul Butler makes precisely this demand for the substantive legitimacy of the
democratic process. For Butler, formal legitimacy is unimportant if it is no
more than propaganda operating to induce compliance to substantively unjust
drug laws in a discriminated-against community. In such circumstances, he
suggests, African American are substantively justified in engaging in direct
action to replace or reject substantively unjust laws,325 and has famously (or
notoriously) argued for jury nullification of non-violent drug crimes because
of the race-based effect of the War on Drugs.326 Butler frames this type of
disregard for unjust laws as a sort of “affirmative action” or, in my terms,
substantive justice for poor, African American drug users.327
Thus, even where the politically active residents of the target neighborhood
endorse measures including curfews and loitering ordinances, it is not clear
that they do so on the self-understanding that these are the best solutions to
their problems. Local residents may generally agree that the solution to gang
activity or juvenile drug dealing is to increase child-care facilities and afterschool programs and engage in mentoring activities with at-risk youth. Due to
a lack of social capital such options, and others like them, are unavailable.328
Extreme measures may appear inviting, especially when it is clear that these
are ones the executive will, in fact, enforce.329 Such measures may appear
especially attractive when the more socially engaged members of the target
neighborhood increase their “social capital”330 across communities through
their sponsorship of such measures.331 Participation alone, however, neither
325
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justifies such laws nor suggests that they are optimal solutions to the problem
at hand.332 Instead, the solution lies in the concept of role-based authority.
V. DISCRETION, AUTONOMY, AND HIGH-STAKES ESCALATION
The real issues in the debate between social norms theorists and legal liberals
are the extent to which the criminal law is substantively legitimate and the
manner in which police power is responsive to local demands to reject
enforcement of substantively illegitimate laws. Social norms theorists claims
that locally rather than remotely generated and enforced standards provide the
solution to the community control of law-enforcement. There are, however,
inherent difficulties in that form of regulation, ones that can be explained,
ironically enough, using the basic concepts of social norms theory. Even at
the local level, so long as police are motivated by their own internal and local
values different from those entertained by the community, they are likely to
respond to general standards in a manner different from the community. The
likelihood that the police will then willingly separate investigative and
preventative roles is reduced, and the goal of empowering the police to engage
in low-level interactions serve only to increase the arsenal available for the
police to wage the high-stakes policing that is part of the War on Drugs.
The social norms approach to legitimacy — empowered democracy — relies
heavily upon an interest in local governance and neighborhood social
organization; not all social norms theories take a similar interest in police selfgovernance and police organization.333 There are a range of true believers and
fellow travelers, variously described as legal pragmatism,334 norm focused
scholarship”; the “New Chicago School”;335 and the “new discretion
scholars,”336 each using the concept of social norms for different purposes.
332
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The distinction I wish to draw in this section is between those scholars
predominantly associated with the New Chicago School, particularly Tracey
Meares and Dan Kahan, who believe low-level policing is a panacea for
negative impact of the War on Drugs and those others, predominantly Debra
Livingston but also William Stuntz,337 who have reservations about that
solution.
New Chicago theorists appear interested in the internal workings of the police,
if at all, primarily to show that departments or officers are not motivated by
racial animus. Their real interest, however, is in community social
organization. Policing is to be at the service of local communities free to
bargain for neighborhood standards and targets of policing without county,
state, or national interference. Livingston is far more interested in the variety
of roles allotted to the police, the tendency of those roles to blur, and the
different constraints — both institutional and constitutional — upon those
roles. In their different ways, these social norms theorists demand, not for
freedom from rule-based constraints, so much as a recalibration of control
through the separation of distinct police roles: investigation and prevention.
A. Discretion and Autonomy: Empowering Local Democracy
No matter the source or sweep of legislative norms (whether at the
neighborhood, city, county, state, or national level) for rules to guide executive
behavior they must be both comprehensible without further instruction338 and
the executive must enforce them in a “transparent” manner — that is, without
adding its own values into the mix. The social norms promotion of
“discretion” and rejection of broad rules should thus be recast as a distrust of,
not rules generally, but rules with a certain source and scope.
The social norms thesis is essentially that rule-based constraints on lawenforcement only work if they are sufficiently local, specific, and
contextualized.339 General norms of constraint — those with constitutional
force and national sweep — ought to be used only to exclude impermissible
values such as racial bias in the legislation and enforcement of laws.340 Where
the police are concerned, rather than operating to constrain the scope of
authority, general norms are better used to carve out a range of positive powers
337
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for the police. What social norms scholars propose is not so much discretion
as autonomy: not the absence of rules regulating and constraining behavior,
but the presence of social and institutional guidelines, regulations, and norms
defining (positively) the role of the police. Their point is to relocate of the
power to generate those rules from inside to outside the law — from legal to
social norms — and down from national, state, or county authorities and into
the local community. Empowered autonomy envisages the police and
community in partnership negotiating law-enforcement strategies as
independent, self-directed entities each with respect for the dignity and
identity of the other.341
This feature of guidance by rules results in what might be called a locally rulebased approach on the part of social norms theorists and undermines the claim
that they approve thoroughgoing police discretion. Both Meares342 and
Livingston343 in fact support constraint of police conduct through local
guidelines of the sort recommended by Amsterdam and other legal liberals.344
While law enforcement officials can always choose to interpret the local law
enforcement initiatives in idiosyncratic ways,345 transparent guidelines can
provide some limit on police power, and can increase legitimacy through ready
availability and good-faith enforcement.346
National, state, or even county control347 rule-based constraint pertain only to
certain general participation-promoting (and so anti-discrimination) values.348
Police authority is rather to be more precisely limited by specific, local
constraints upon permissible action, developed in partnership with or
responsive to the local community and its standards.349 That partnership
posture promotes institutional autonomy. The police are required to negotiate
with local communities as allies, experts, and advisors, and on occasion act so
341
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as to overcome local self-interest or bias.350 The goal is to develop
institutional self-conceptions (and understandings of the relationship between
law-enforcement and community) that reorient policing towards a new, more
preventative role.351
The foundations of this process of community-police regulation — dignity,
respect, and trust — are captured by the concept of autonomy. Autonomy has
both a social and a normative strand: it accepts that individuals, institutions,
and communities are socially situated within a history and locality, but
recognizes that these entities can take a range of evaluative attitudes to their
social situation that have normative consequences. Accordingly, autonomous
or autonomy-respecting relationships consist in dialogue rather than demand,
appreciative that the other has certain goals and identifications that must be
respected even if they are ultimately to be rejected.352
This concept of two autonomous entities engaged in mutually beneficial
dialogue fits the community-creating form of policing premised on reciprocal
relationships of trust and respect.353 Recently Dan Kahan has suggested that,
“individuals in collective action settings behave not like rational wealth
maximizers but rather like moral and emotional reciprocators. When they
perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing to public goods,
most individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do
the same.”354 In an atmosphere of distrust, individuals will engage in noncooperation, even at some cost to themselves.355 In the context of public-order
policing, the issue is whether “community residents and police [will]
contribute to the collective good of cooperation and respect or
instead … approach one another with suspicion and animosity.”356 Ordermaintenance policing thus directly and indirectly benefits communities
through creating trust between police and residents and promoting
guardianship and friendship networks that better enable the public to police
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themselves without incarcerating large numbers of minority drug users as part
of the War on Drugs.357
In their preventative role, police on the beat are expected to engage in a large
degree of self-regulation, eschewing the temptation to escalate low-level
encounters into a punitive style of drug enforcement.358 Legitimacy thus
depends not upon rule-based constraint but upon police willingness to adopt a
limited, preventative, and community oriented role. Citizen review operates at
the beginning of the process, to develop appropriate guidelines or identify
places and people in need of increased police care, and continues not as a posthoc sanction to punish police misconduct, but as a means of evaluating and
redirecting police performance and police-community goals.359 The operating
principles are “persuasion”360 and “[t]rust”…the individual's belief that the
authority will act not only fairly but also predictably in the future.”361 The
police are therefore to be treated with the same respect and autonomy with
which they are expected to treat the public.
B. Police Enforcement Practices and Internalization of Legal Norms
There are a variety of possible critiques of a program that replaces broad city,
county, or national standards with a patchwork quilt of crime zones, each
enforcing different standards of behavior and some prohibiting the exercise of
innocent or constitutionally protected conduct. One I wish to suggest is that
divergence between general and local norms may be replicated at the local
level by divergence between local and institutional norms. In fact, the
concepts of social meaning and social influence provide a ready account of
such variances, and experience suggests the profound consequences even
when policing “only” low-level crime.
To elaborate the manner in which local police and community interests may
diverge despite local partnerships, it is worth reminding ourselves of some of
357
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the ways in which social norms theorists believe norms are internalized, and to
place them in the context of theories of norms more generally. While that
account provides further ammunition against rule-based constraints upon
policing, it also suggests that the police are likely to take advantage of their
ability to shift roles when engaging in public order policing to suit their own
administrative agenda. Such considerations do not undermine the concept of
role-based restraints but suggest a radical re-thinking of the how, if not the
why, of community policing.
1. Social Meaning, Social Influence, and Institutional
Conduct
The concept of social meaning suggests that, generally, we understand a norm
against the background set and structure of norms that we have variously
internalized.362 The manner in which the norm is placed within an agent’s set
of values, goals, and beliefs — its social meaning — may be different from its
legislated meaning — the values, goals, and beliefs entertained by the lawmaker. The intermediary of social meaning can break link between legislated
norms and social norms and render opaque the manner in which the legislated
norm will be adopted by the prosecutor or the police. The relative social
influence of the norm determines how forceful and widespread such a rupture
will be.
The problem is that the social meaning of a norm — its value for a particular
subject — generates different degrees of social influence. Legal liberal
solutions to executive law enforcement, though all too aware of administrative
discretion in law enforcement, have tended to rely upon rules to constrain
discretion and have ignored the ability of rules alone to create it. As we have
seen, rule-based constraints on the scope of authority operate through
transparent, prospective rules to limit a decision-maker’s discretion. Rules
362
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can, however, generate discretion in a variety of ways: more general norms
tend to flatten nuances between different subjects or situations, including
greater numbers of people within the scope of the norm;363 competing intrainstitutional norms may conflict, causing ambiguities in the scope of authority;
social or other institutions norms may define the point and practice of an
institutions norms in ways not contemplated by or in conflict with the
institutional norms.
As recognized in recent discussions of administrative systems: the
administration of norms often departs significantly from the purposes
contemplated during the legislative process not because there are too few
norms controlling conduct, but too many.364 Where rule-based grants of
authority are structured by a series of administrative norms that arise from
executive custom or are enacted by the executive agency itself, the
administrative official responds to executive rather than legislative or public
regulations (if, indeed there are any available). These may include the
operating procedures regulating the day-to-day practice of the executive body,
training manuals, and directives from senior to junior officials.365 Some may
directly enforce legislative norms; others may have a less direct impact,
channeling the resources and energies of the enforcement branch in ways that
bolster or undermine legislative initiatives.
Other practices may be
unsystematic and ad hoc, dependent upon the discretion of individual officials
— police officers or prosecutors.366 In general, they will help to determine the
official’s and the institution’s sense of its role and so determine the selfconception of the scope of its authority: a self-conception that the public and
courts may come to credit.
As Debra Livingston argues, more and clearer legislative norms do nothing to
alter the administrative discretion of law enforcement agencies.367 In part, this
may be due to what Jamison Colburn has called the “cascading” effect of
administrative regulations.368 The executive authority to interpret laws and
363
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determine the manner of their enforcement generates a range of practices and
procedures that may owe nothing to the purposes of the original legislation and
everything to the administrative imperatives of the regulatory agency.369 The
extant customs and traditions of the administrative institution, along with the
agency’s interests in preserving its jurisdictional authority and internal
hierarchy, render the impact of legislation less predictable and direct than
might be imagined or desired. All this is predictable given the concepts of
social meaning and social influence integral to the social norms explanation of
regulated intentional conduct.
2. Policing Enforcement Practices and Externailization
of Legal Norms
Indeed, the executive branch may even adopt an “external” or “prudential”
attitude to legislation as a means of increasing its discretion. Rather than
internalizing legislative norms as intrinsically or instrumentally worthwhile,
the executive may be interested only in the range of sanctions consequent to
violating the norms. One interesting example of this is the New York City
police force’s attitude to Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio,370 which
applied the Fourth Amendment to the states. As Yale Kamisar has explained,
New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy’s reaction to the
different legal standards pre- and post-Mapp offers a striking demonstration of
the manner in which a rule determining the culpability and sanction for nonconforming conduct may be regarded, from the external perspective, as a
behavior-guiding rule.371
Prior to Mapp, New York State had adopted a rule that prohibited illegal
searches and seizures as a violation of civil and criminal law372 but permitted
the prosecutor to use illegally seized evidence.373 The police commissioner
considered that the pre-Mapp rule — which determined the consequences of
unlawful conduct — could be used as a rule guiding that conduct. This
administrative refusal to internalize and apply legislative norms has a
legitimacy cost: it undermines the relationship between state and citizen.374
369

Id.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
371
See Kamisar, Defense, supra note 124; Kamisar, “Old World” Criminal Procedure, supra
note 153 at 559. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, established the New York State law on the
admissibility of illegally seized evidence applicable prior to Mapp.
372
See Defore, 150 N.E. at 586-87 (“The officer might have been resisted, or sued for
damages, or even prosecuted for oppression. [Citation omitted] He was subject to removal or
other discipline at the hands of his superiors. These consequences are undisputed.”).
373
See Defore, 150 N.E. at 589.
374
See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 166, at 667 (discussing importance of correspondence of
police rules of conduct with community sentiment) (citing O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 41 (1938) “The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, right or wrong.”).
370

60

ROLE-BASED POLICING
The law as published precluded various forms of police conduct; the law as
enforced applied a much different standard (the rule operated as a license
rather than a prohibition).375 The transformation of prohibition into license is
not part of the participative legislative process — in fact, it undermines it and
replaces it with a set of non-public police tactics designed to frustrate the law.
These illegitimate administrative procedures may even be ratified by
legislative action or inaction where the legislature has the power to repeal the
norms justifying the procedure.376
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Chavez v. Martinez,377 and Missouri v.
Seibert,378 demonstrate that the prudential attitude to norms is of current
vintage and national impact. Both cases arose from police violations of
suspects’ Fifth Amendment Miranda rights; in both cases the police were
trained or instructed to violate the suspects’ rights. The executive, role-based,
crime-control interest in obtaining the information trumped a proper
understanding of Miranda v. Arizona379 as presenting a rule-based prohibition
on non-consensual interrogations.380 Instead, a variety of state and federal
law-enforcement training programs381 “disfigure[d]”382 the Court’s reasoning
375
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conduct that produced the proffered evidence, to keep the judicial process from being
contaminated by partnership in police misconduct, and to assure the police and the public
alike that the Court took the fourth amendment seriously.” Kamisar, supra note 153, at 560.
377
123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
378
124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
379
384 U.S. 436 (1965).
380
Despite the Court’s reiteration of the constitutional foundation of the warnings in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). See Missouri v. Seibert, Brief Amici Curiae
of Former Prosecutors, Judges and Law Enforcement Officials, Supporting Respondent (filed
October 8, 2003). That brief was filed by former prosecutors, including Charles D.
Weisselberg, Professor of Law at the University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall)
Berkeley, and Stephen J. Schulhofer of NYU Law School’s Brennan Center for Justice. In
that brief, they pointed out that “[f]rom the outset, law enforcement officials have understood
that Miranda's warning requirement applies directly to them. …No reasonable interpretation
of th[e Court’s] language leaves any room to contend that the warnings are optional, not
mandatory, or that they are anything other than binding upon police. Id. at 5. Furthermore, in
his opinion respecting denial of sua sponte call for full court en banc rehearing in United
States v. Orso, 275 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001), Judge Stephen Trott, himself a former
state and federal prosecutor, suggested a refusal to exclude “outside Miranda” interrogations
would send a clear message to police trainers: “Don't advise, interrogate the suspect, violate
the Constitution, use subtle and deceptive pressure, take advantage of the inherently coercive
setting, and then, after the damage has been done, after the beachhead has been gained, gently
advise the suspect of her rights.” Id.
381
See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608-09, 2609 n.2 (discussing training materials including Police
Law Institute, Illinois Police Law Manual; California Commission on Peace Officer
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in Oregon v. Elstad,383 treating that Court’s tort-style causation analysis
instead as a prescription for how to avoid exclusion of un-Mirandized
confessions.384 Indeed, one of the major worries identified by critics of the
police procedures used in Seibert was the manner in which state and national
training programs undermined local police guidelines or standards.
Whether one regards the Elstad rule as a prohibition or permission upon unMirandized interrogations depends upon factors internal to the police
investigative role. While such an executive transformation of legislative
norms may be regarded by some as a perversion of the law, it may be regarded
by others as justified given the exigencies of crime fighting. For example,
police training videos emphasized that the interrogation is often their “one
shot” at solving serious crime.385 The Court’s finding of substantive
Standards and Training, Video Training Programs for California Law Enforcement, Miranda:
Post-Invocation Questioning (broadcast July 11, 1996); D. Zulawski & D. Wicklander,
Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation 50-51 (2d ed.2002)). See also Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110, 132-139 (1998).
382
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611.
383
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
384
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 313 (1985). Charles
Weisselberg’s study of questioning “outside Miranda” provides an apt demonstration of the
problem.
A bulletin prepared by the Orange County, California District Attorney's
office following Peevy described the state high court's characterization of
“outside Miranda” questioning as illegal as “unfortunate dictum” that would
“be open to serious dispute if [it] should ever form the basis of a ruling.”
The bulletin continued: “Meanwhile, like they say down home, 'If you've
caught the fish, don't fret about losing the bait.”
Weisselberg, supra note 367, at 1143-44. See also Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195
F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) (police officers regularly subverting Miranda pursuant to official
policy set forth in training programs and materials); Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444. Brief
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 21 (filed October 25, 2002) (“California Supreme
Court's disapproval of such conduct had little effect on police training”).
385
Weisselberg provides an example of police training procedures in a video encouraging
officers to interrogate “outside Miranda”:
What if you've got a guy [in custody] that you've only got one shot at? This
is it, it's now or never because you're gonna lose him--he's gonna bail out or
a lawyer's on the way down there, or you're gonna have to take him over and
give him over to some other officials--you're never gonna have another
chance at this guy, this is it. And you Mirandize him and he invokes. What
you can do — legally do — in that instance is go outside Miranda and
continue to talk to him because you've got other legitimate purposes in
talking to him other than obtaining an admission of guilt that can be used in
his trial. … [Y]ou may want to go outside Miranda and get information to
help you clear cases. … Or maybe it will help you recover a dead body or
missing person. … You may be able to recover stolen property. … Maybe
his statement will identify other criminals that are capering in your
community. … Or, his statements might reveal the existence and location of
physical evidence. You've got him, but you'd kinda like to have the gun that
he used or the knife that he used. … [Y]ou go “outside Miranda” and take a
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illegitimacy is supported by the collateral consequences of such interrogations:
the “outside Miranda” practices followed by police and endorsed by some
prosecutors had the effect — of which the police were apparently aware — of
keeping defendants from testifying in their own defense for fear of
impeachment.386
C. Encounter and Escalation
A consequence of institutional deviation from general norms is that low-level
criminal offences have a different “social meaning” for officers and for the
local community. Low-level crimes serve as a gateway to investigating higherlevel crimes and policing tends to operate through technique of escalation. In
fact, the whole direction of policing under the Fourth Amendment is to use
low-level encounters to engage the public, then progress through the stages of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to high-stakes interactions resulting
in arrest.387 For New Chicago theorists, generally the point is to reorient
policing, not solve crime.388 They therefore assume that the police will be
willing to tolerate private crime so long as there is public order.
Now, if public order policing works to reduce crime, it does so for one of two
reasons: either because the same amount of crime now occurs in an orderly
way in a private space; or because the people who would engage in public
crime are caught or driven elsewhere. If it is the latter, public order policing
statement and then he tells you where the stuff is, we can go and get all that
evidence.
Weisselberg, supra note 381, at 110, 135-136.
386
See id. at 110, 135-136 (police training video stated that questioning “outside Miranda”
“forces the defendant to commit to a statement that will prevent him from pulling out some
defense and using it at trial — that he's cooked up with some defense lawyer — that wasn't
true. So if you get a statement ‘outside Miranda’ and he tells you that he did it and how he did
it or if he gives you a denial of some sort, he's tied to that, he is married to that.”)
387
For an excellent example of the way this “routine” works in the context of traffic stops, see
Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,”
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843 (2003-2004).
388
That is certainly Tracey Meares’s orientation, see Meares, supra note 77, at 1347; Meares,
Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224; at one point it appears to be Debra Livingston’s.
See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10. Livingston, however, seems most interested in
investigative policing when discussing community caretaking. See Livingston, Caretaking,
supra note 10 at, 271-77. Livingston could be making an argument about the standard by
which to evaluate the reasonableness of intrusions upon privacy to engage in the caretaking
role. Such a discussion would properly implicate, not criminal cases, but civil cases for
damages consequent to some tort of constitutional magnitude committed by the police when
executing their caretaking function. The standard for such a suit is high (shocks the
conscience) and the police enjoy a certain degree of immunity, so such cases are infrequent.
But civil infractions consequent to the severely negligent or intentionally maleficent
performance of the caretaking function is not Livingston’s target. Instead, she wants criminal
investigation consequent to caretaking to be free from the warrant requirement. Id.
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works precisely because of the escalation effect: policing low-order crime
enables high-stakes busts. If it is the former, then what is required is that the
police (who recognized through their preventative, public order encounters,
that high-stakes crime is occurring) turn a blind eye to crime so long as it is
private and orderly. Debra Livingston suggests that the police tend to endorse
the latter expectations.
The importance of role-based constraints should now be obvious. It is the
conjunction of the War on Drugs’ punishment-oriented law enforcement with
the police’s investigative role that is problematic, not discretion per se. Social
norms theories endorse a form of leveling down, not in the rates of policing
but in the rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, and believe the police
and the public can be bought off by the gains in public order and perceptions
of legitimacy. So long as the police can separate their investigative from their
preventative or caretaking roles, community policing will help create the trust
relations upon which public order policing depends.
Most worryingly for social norms theorists, not only law enforcement but also
the court has chosen to understand the type of low-level encounters central to
public-order policing as non-coercive and central to the investigatory process.
Where social norms theorists seek to draw bright lines between the police’s
investigative role on the one hand and its preventative or caretaking role on the
other, both police and Court seek to fudge the issue. In a series of cases
concerned with traffic stops,389 the Court has removed a series of low-level
encounters from the purview of the Fourth Amendment, and permitted the
police to search and interrogate motorists and passengers in a manner that
quickly escalates, via the “fiction” of consent, into high-stakes drug
policing.390 In effect, such cases translated the rationale of Terry into the
motor-vehicle context and permitted the vast range of low-level offenses,
sufficient to render almost any use of a motor vehicle subject to police
regulation,391 to operate as grounds for a variety of more or less invasive highstakes encounters with the police as part of the War on Drugs. The whole
point of public order policing is to enact a similar set of low-level offenses so
as to expand the role of the police in community affairs.
389

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218; Mimms, 434 US 106; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 457-38;
Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690; Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
390
Sklansky, supra note 151, at 320-23. See also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-34 (1999) (discussing consent
searches); Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1071-73.
391
In the car stop situation it does not matter whether the initial infraction is civil or criminal,
so long as the police have the power to detain the driver. Compare Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996) (temporary detention of motorist who the police have probable cause to
believe has committed civil traffic violation is consistent with Fourth Amendment) with
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (warrantless arrest for misdemeanor
traffic offence is permissible under Fourth Amendment).
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1. Role-Confusion and Escalation
The police already perform a vast range of preventative functions in the
community. For example, Debra Livingston points out the difference between
the police’s caretaking and investigative roles.392
The “caretaking
393
functions” include:
a wide range of everyday police activities undertaken to aid those in
danger of physical harm, to preserve property, or “to create and
maintain a feeling of security in the community.” It includes things
like the mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints about
stray and injured animals, and the provision of assistance to the ill or
injured. Police must frequently “care for those who cannot care for
themselves: the destitute, the inebriated, the addicted . . . and the very
young.” They are often charged with taking lost property into their
possession; they not infrequently see to the removal of abandoned
property. In those places where social disorganization is at its
highest, police are even called upon “to serve as surrogate parent or
other relative, and to fill in for social workers, housing inspectors,
attorneys, physicians, and psychiatrists.” Community caretaking,
then, is an essential part of the functioning of local police.394

The caretaking role, she claims, cannot and should not be regulated in the
manner of the investigative role: rather, it concerns police intrusions that are
generally supported by the community and which ought to be promoted so
long as reasonable. Although many of these activities intrude upon privacy
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, they are not motivated by an
investigatory interest, and so should be measured by a substantially different
set of assumptions.395 Livingston thus contends that the (rule-based) “warrant
preference”396 is inapposite when measuring caretaking intrusion.397
Livingston is, however, more ambivalent than Meares and Kahan about the
separation of investigative and preventative roles. Clearly, it is hard to draw a
bright line between investigation and caretaking: nonetheless, so long as
caretaking is properly motivated, Livingston argues, any investigative fruits
are fair game for the police.398 In part, Livingston’s approach explains her
rejection of broad based substantive laws, such as curfews, and demand for
392

See Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10.
Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 441 (1973).
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Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at 272.
395
Id. at 265, 271.
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Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
197, 203-04 (1993)
397
Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at, 265-271.
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Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10.
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more targeted norms. Livingston supports anti-gang loitering ordinances
precisely because they narrowly target, not only the individuals to be policed,
but also the officers who do the policing.399 In part, her approach demands a
much greater transformation of police administration than that contemplated
by Meares or Kahan, accompanied by a variety of mechanisms for oversight
and reform.400
Nonetheless, Livingston’s analysis of the caretaking role paradoxically
demonstrates one of the strengths of the liberal legal rule-based approach:
while it may not deter police conduct, it certainly operates to preclude some
conduct from having legal effect. From Mapp to Seibert, that has been the role
of the exclusionary, rule-based approach to police action in excess of or
contrary to their legitimate authority. This rule-based approach serves to
provide the hard separation of investigative from preventative policing
required by the “trust and respect” perspective. It is precisely the function of
the warrant requirement to require the police, in certain circumstances, to take
additional steps to move from one role to the other and so prohibit
investigative windfalls from the caretaking role.401
2. “No Neighborhood is an Island”402
A further problem for the separation-of-roles requirement is that localities are
not hermetically sealed. As the traffic enforcement context makes apparent,
low-level policing is not geographically specific in the manner demanded by
social norms theorists. Meares critique of legal liberal “county level”
solutions to local criminal justice problems403 is totally misplaced in the
context of vehicle stops — and vehicles are precisely at the vanguard of drug
policing and depend upon the use of low-level encounters.404 Just as the
techniques used in traffic stops are transferable to pedestrians, so many
pedestrians become the drivers of automobiles, or passengers in cars, buses,
and trains. Furthermore, it is in just these encounters — at the side of the road,
on the bus, in the airport — that public self-reliance or autonomy from police
pressure may be at its weakest. It is here that the polite police “May I” is most
likely to obtain grudging consent.405
399

Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 13; Debra Livingston, Police Patrol, Judicial
Integrity, and the Limits of Judicial Control, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1353 (1998).
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See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 27; Livingston, supra note 74.
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Furthermore, current law permits such windfalls where there is an investigative
justification for invading privacy: either some independent source, Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533 (1988), or a showing that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered,
Nix. v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 632.
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Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 688.
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David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (1997).
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Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The consent doctrine demonstrates the manner in which rule-based constraints
upon authority can generate role-based social influence. The police have a
narrowly circumscribed authority to search individuals without a sufficient
quantum of evidence to suspect criminal conduct. But, by virtue of the
generally compliant attitude of the general public, they wield a social influence
in excess of their legal influence and so may induce consent against the
suspect’s interest.
A common explanation of consent to searches is in terms of lack of
information backed by intimidation: the failure to alert citizens that they need
not consent and are free to leave,406 combined with their generalized feelings
of coercion during a police encounter, preclude citizens from asserting their
rights.407 A complimentary explanation based on social influence would
suggest that the public afford the officer a social authority that outstrips any
granted by the law. Court emphasis on the legal contours of the police role
fudges the issue of the legitimate scope of authority in these low-level
encounters. A focus on the acts of the police ignores the significance of the
encounter for the civilian. The Court’s emphasis on politeness in police
conduct sidesteps the coercive ramifications of the encounter.
Divergent social meanings of police politeness present significant problems
for social norms descriptions of formally legitimate police conduct. Politeness
is a social-norms criterion of successful community policing.408 But if the
polite police “May I” is in fact experienced by the public as intimidating — if,
as Sklansky suggests, the idea of non-coercion is a “fiction” — then low-level
policing is formally illegitimate. If the targets of policing are not low-level
crimes, but rather escalation to engage in high-stakes policing as part of the
War on Drugs, then low-level policing is substantively illegitimate as well.
The inevitable result is that minorities translate experiences of being pulled
over for “driving while black” to local encounters with police. In other words,
disparate policing practices outside the neighborhood at the county, state, and
national level can undercut minority perceptions of the government’s right to
legislate criminal norms at the local level.409 So long as the channels of
transportation are used to engage in the high-stakes policing associated with
the War on Drugs, the disparate treatment of a minority community will
continue to “undermine commitment to the law by minority law abiders by
406

See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 151.
See, id.; COLE, supra note 390.
408
See Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 215, at 1195, 1197; Meares, Legitimacy & Law,
supra note 28, at 403.
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Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1616. See also Meares, Social Organization, supra
note 10, at 214.
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fostering a perception of illegitimacy of government among members of the
stigmatized minority group.”410
Where the police conflate investigative and preventative roles, legal liberals
tend to support cutting off the investigative role by rule-based constraints
where possible, but mostly by diminishing the amount of policing received
minority communities. This is, however, to leave local communities underpoliced. The social norms attempt to separate roles depends upon notions of
local autonomy and transparent partnerships and “trust relationships” between
the police and the community. Experience and their own concepts of social
meaning and social influence suggest, however, that national programs and
institutional imperatives urging role-conflation and “escalating up” will trump
local community norms.
A different solution is to separate roles by differentiating the individuals and
institutions responsible for public order and investigative policing. Let the
police engage in investigation and find another group without the personal or
institutional motivation to conflate preventative with institutional roles. To
avoid the perception of under-policing, that group would have to be visible
and associated with municipal or state governments; to engender trust and
avoid the perception of over-policing, the group would have to have no rolebased investigative authority. While there is no perfect solution to “the central
question…: How can we reduce perceived bias without reducing the level of
law enforcement in poor black communities?,”411 there are some candidates
available to engage in the sort of precisely targeted policing of subjects and
situations demanded by social norms theorists.
VI. ROLE-BASED COMMUNITY POLICING
My proposal is to separate preventative policing focused on public order or
quality of life issues from reactive investigative policing focused on
apprehending criminals. In contrast with liberal legal theories, I believe that
police adherence to national or self-generated guides is no solution given the
police tendency to translate norms from prohibitions to licenses, and to
escalate low-level encounters into high-stakes interventions. One of the Social
Norm school’s fundamental insights is the transformative effect of our critical
reflective attitude towards promulgated norms or regularly repeating
phenomena. The range of institutional imperatives structuring the lawenforcement role decisively influences the attitude of the prosecutor or the
police to social and legal norms.
410

Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 678. See also COLE, supra note 390 at 169-78
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Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at, 1836.
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In contrast to social norms theories, however, I suggest that encouraging
“polite” interactions between police and public, and concentrating on lowlevel substantive crimes is no alternative to the War on Drugs. The police use
precisely these encounters to engage in high-stakes policing, blurring the line
between, on the one hand, preventative and caretaking roles and, on the other,
investigative policing. The courts are right to separate roles through the
Fourth Amendment and deny the fruits of investigation to policing motivated
by caretaking.412 That type of role-based separation cannot, however, be
accomplished by rule-based limits on the scope of authority, as the police
routinely engage in a range of encounters through which they utilize their
social influence to avoid Fourth, and sometimes Fifth Amendment scrutiny.
The solution to problems of urban policing is not — or not only — to equalize
police tactics by policing upscale communities in the same manner as
downscale ones.413 Nor is it simply to remove the police from urban
communities. To properly address the quality of life problems undermining
community cohesion, municipalities must separate public order policing from
investigative policing. The police should continue to have authority to engage
in investigation and detection of serious crime; however public order policing
should be delegated to agents with limited authority to arrest or investigate and
who have public order as his or her primary institutional goal. Such
individuals have neither the authority to use or interest in using criminal norms
as a means of engaging in collateral policing of drug crimes.
In what follows, I consider a range of public-municipal interactions to identify
the type of municipal official able to engage in public order policing. Some
local communities already successfully negotiate the limits of policing,
requiring the police to direct their activities to investigation, and partnering
with local school, housing, and transportation authorities to remove the
sources of public disorder. Municipalities could, however, do more:
reconstructing the activities of some local officials to engage in promoting
public order.
A. Municipal-Community Partnerships
The social norms literature is replete with discussions of partnerships between
local communities, the police, municipal authorities, and private entities. It is
412

Livingston cites a number of Supreme Court and lower court opinions that take this
position. See Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at 301-03 (citing Skinner v Railway
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worth briefly recounting a couple to give an overview of the subjects and
workings of such partnerships, if only to demonstrate that police activity is a
relatively minor part of the order-restoring activity. Most of public order
policing turns out to require reclaiming and reconfiguring public spaces and
avoiding the type of incident that would give rise to investigation through
managing municipally controlled movements of people through public
facilities or by public transportation.414
The Chicago Bus Transfer Station, on the corner of 100th and Pullman Streets
in Chicago, Illinois, was a crime hot-spot suffering from a gang problem
exacerbated by the presence of students from a local high school.415 Disorder
was particularly pronounced on days in which there had been fights at school.
While the police provided a car to monitor the station, the real solution to the
problem involved a partnership between parents, the Chicago Transport
Authority, and the principal of the high school: the principal staggered class
times to reduce pupil traffic, and the Transport Authority provided buses to
bypass the Transfer Station and transport students directly to and from the high
school.416
In the Lake View neighborhood of Chicago, drug dealers used a sunken
concrete pit in a local park at night to sell crack and engage in prostitution.417
The residents initially encouraged more policing after dark — but over the
longer term they remodeled the park, trimming the trees to make the interior
more visible from the street, installing night lights, and redesigning the park to
remove the pit and create a series of amenities more attractive to legitimate
users.418 To effect the clean up and redesign of the park, residents enlisted the
help of the “streets and sanitation department, the parks department, a friendly
architect, private foundations, and local businesses.”419 Their efforts were
overwhelmingly successful in reducing the illegal activity within the park.420
Both these examples occurred in a city that has made great strides in reforming
its police departments to promote local accountability at the neighborhood
level.421 In other words, Chicago appears to have engaged in some of the
reform that Livingston suggests is essential to constraining the police role.
414

Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 618-23.
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The Mayor’s Office and Chicago Police Department reorganized the police
officers into “neighborhood-sized ‘beat teams,’” provided training for officers
as part of a “striking” series of reforms directed at increasing partnerships with
the local community, and required officers to engage in monthly meetings with
local residents.422 As described by Archon Fung, a Harvard professor of
public policy, the City had to engage in educating or re-educating, not only the
police, but also the local community, hiring organizers “to knock on doors,
post posters, contact community leaders, and call and facilitate meetings.”423
Yet, as the two Chicago examples, above, make clear, better public-police
relations are only part of the solution.
Of particular importance to community order-maintenance efforts are
problems resulting from “land use patterns and the ecological distributions of
daily routine activities … The location of schools, the mix of residential with
commercial land use (e.g., strip malls, bars), public transportation nodes, and
large flows of nighttime visitors.”424 Recent studies of community disorder
suggest both that links between crime and disorder are not so direct as some
would suppose, and partnerships between police and communities, without
more, are not the solution.425 If the police are not to transform public order
policing to comport with their own priorities, then citizens must assume the
dominant role in partnering process. Many of the local responses to crime and
disorder emphasize social relationships that require the police to act, if at all,
in their traditional investigative role and engage in partnerships with other
agencies as part of the process of prevention. These include “‘graffiti
patrols’ …; agitating for voting referendums to delicense bars where drug
sales and disorder loom large [and t]he razing of a vacant ‘drug house’ by
housing authorities.”426
Quite aside from restructuring the administrative bureaucracy of the police in
terms of public accountability, then, there exists an opportunity to emphasize
municipal-public relationships other than those involving the police. A range
of municipal agencies are responsible for public order: education,
transportation, and housing to name but three. And they are involved in public
order policing on two distinct levels: engaging in local, preventative
422
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partnerships to respond to those situational factors that locate crime at various
points in the neighborhood; and transmitting norms of law-abidingness across
the community by responding to the low-level disturbances of public order
within their jurisdiction.
1. Private Policing: A Comparison
A useful point of comparison is the type of private policing used for patrol in
“wealthier neighborhoods . . . quasi-public spaces, such as shopping centers,
all kinds of parking lots, and other private property open to the public.”427
These private guards participate in limited policing — they are invited in by
the relevant community to do their bidding, and they “possess no greater legal
capabilities than do ordinary citizens to forcibly detain persons who are
suspected of or have in fact committed a crime.”428 Rather than engaging in
arrests and detentions the private police tend to “treat matters privately —
banning, firing, and fining — instead of pursuing prosecution.”429 Finally,
even in the realm of drug crime, so long as they perform the primary goals of
preventing “loss” (the theft of commercial goods) or maintaining social order,
other “kinds and amounts of deviance” may be tolerable.430
For example, Elizabeth Joh provides, as an example of private policing, a
Greyhound Bus Lines terminal in Tennessee, where the guards “routinely
release persons who have been found with small amounts of drugs on their
persons.”431 According to Joh, “The public police were notified, according to
the Greyhound guards, only when the quantity of drugs found warranted a
felony charge.”432 Thus, precisely in the arena of drug policing, private police
concerned with order-maintenance rather than investigation and escalation
ignored low-level illegal drug possession in favor of controlling public order
in their assigned locality.
Private policing is thus, to an extent, a model of role-based limits on the
promotion of public order. Although private police enforcement practices may
be completely transparent, they are certainly subject to social and economic
pressures to engage in discipline of guards who do not treat the community
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with some form of respect.433 Such police have a “demonstrably substantial”
impact on norms of social conduct.434 “Private police keep people from
drinking from bottles, arguing loudly, running around recklessly, or playing
loud music.”435 They police precisely the sorts of disruptions of “routine
activity”436 and specific locations — malls, schools, and transportation nodes
— that are of particular concern to public order maintenance.
Due to problems of cost and logistics, private policing may not be a solution
for urban neighborhoods. Furthermore, private police may send the wrong
signal — that the neighborhood does not deserve or require public policing —
so perpetuating historical perceptions of race and class based bias. The task
for municipalities, then, is to identify a range of municipal officials who can
engage in the same type of policing as private security forces, focused on loss
rather than harm,437 and bans and fines rather than arrests. Such policing does
not remove the police from the community, but does emphasize the public
(and municipal official’s) role in calling upon the police, as well as redirecting
policing resources to the dominant ones of response and investigation of
crime.
B. Municipal Institutions, Public Officials
A variety of municipal officials have engaged in activities that have a policing
component, most recently as part of the “War on Terror.”438 Many of these
officials work on buses and trains, in transportation terminals, or on the streets
enforcing parking or littering ordinances. In contrast to the police or private
security officers, many of these public officials are residents of the
communities in which they work, or travel so frequently through the
community that they are identified with the particular neighborhoods in which
they work. Delegating increased responsibilities for policing public order
reconstitutes such officials as norm entrepreneurs charged with signaling
norms of public order to their peers within the community. Furthermore, such
municipal officials are able to communicate a powerful message — that
quality-of-life issues matter and the government is taking it seriously — while
simultaneously modeling appropriate norms of behavior in normatively
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fragmented communities. The community is thus encouraged to participate in
the process of policing: members of the local community are encouraged to
pick up their trash, scoop up after their dogs, not congregate in a threatening
manner on street corners, keep the noise down, and obey consistent norms.
Some recent empirical evidence supports this type of community self-reliance
policing.439 Local norms of cooperation, especially directed at controlling the
behavior and misbehavior of children, has a significant impact on public
order.440 In addition to control of children in public places — at street corners
with crossing guards, on public buses — these public officials can identify and
address the familiar causes of urban blight: the abandoned cars, dumped trash,
and broken windows that undermine the quality of life in fragmented urban
communities. While not a solution for every problem, such policing strikes
the balance between ignoring the problem of public order and the worrisome
effects of the War on Drugs.
Thus, to consider the two examples of order-maintenance policing from
Chicago, above: typical problem areas are bars, with the familiar problems of
noisy, drunken behavior; transportation nodes, schools, and parks, which may
be the site of anti-social gang activity441 or illegal activity such as drug
dealing; and houses or business that provide a site contributing to public
disorder.442 Problem activities include drug dealing, and staking out “turf”
through “loitering” on street corners or “cruising” up and down neighborhood
streets, intimidating local residents through public displays of gang activity or
disrupting the peace in residential communities. Some of these activities may
be solved by redesign of the location of disorder, others by municipal
employees enforcing of norms of order in schools, bus and train terminals, and
parks. While not a solution to every problem, certainly municipal authorities
can organize areas and target infrastructure without engaging in dangerous
interactions, and can alert police to where dangerous or violent disorder
occurs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The structural considerations that operate at the executive level require that, in
executing the laws, the police and prosecutors treat not just individual agents
but whole communities with respect. The problem facing the police is their
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social and institutional distance from a particular community and the oftenhazardous settings in which they are required to interact with its most
dangerous members. Where social fragmentation is pronounced, there may be
few individuals in authority and with social influence to whom they can appeal
to participate in the norm-creating process. From the other side of the
equation, “the dwellers of the ghettos and the barrios of this land . . . view the
policeman as ‘an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country.’”443
“Normative” policing thus counsels at least moderation in the adversarial
stance between police and community: adversarialism smacks of an attitude
that is the antithesis of respect. Especially so when the individuals at the sharp
end of police practices — including those with social authority — may
themselves engage in criminal and quasi-criminal activities and have a
complex attitude to law-abidingness.444 Such problems are complex, and may
require the use of the police and prosecutorial enforcement discretion.
Escalation suggests that the problem of policing in minority communities is
not too many police but too harsh policing. Those who reject the legal liberal
claim of “over-policing” may be right that more policing is required to restore
or maintain order, but are wrong to suggest that police officers are best placed
to engage in this preventative role. “Over-policing,” in other words, has
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and each side in the debate shifts from
number of police to type of policing depending upon which best supports their
argument.
My solution is a simple one: to prevent escalation by requiring officials other
than the police to have primary responsibility for preventative policing. That
is not to deny the police a role in community policing, but to recognize that the
police’s role is and should be secondary in the realm of public order. Highstakes escalation should be the last, and not the first resort, in poor
communities as it is in better-off ones. This program requires a moderate reallocation of resources and interests that empowers municipal officials at the
same time as redirecting and sharpening the police investigative role.
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